Update on the Master’s, a joint Master of Laws (LL.M.) degree offered by the United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR) and the Law Faculty of Sigmund Freud Private University Vienna

I am pleased to provide an update that I have completed eleven of the fourteen courses in the master’s in public international law, a joint Master of Laws (LL.M.) degree offered by the United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR) and the Law Faculty of Sigmund Freud Private University Vienna. I am grateful for the outstanding faculty, the opportunities provided through UNITAR, and the journey through the program with my colleagues from around the world. I highly recommend the course of study. The one-year program combines the academic strength of Sigmund Freud University Vienna with the practical focus of UNITAR, providing students with a deep understanding of international law, and direct insights into the activities of the United Nations and other international organizations. Before I describe the program further, it is helpful to explain how I arrived at this program.

My interest in public international law was sparked by working as a research assistant for Professor David D. Caron at Berkeley, during which I authored a paper on the Antarctic Treaty System. Over the years, I have had the opportunity to serve as an Internet domain name arbitrator for WIPO, intern with the United States Trade Representative, practice private law at a large law firm and in my own practice, intern with the Institución Nacional de Derechos Humanos y Defensoría del Pueblo (INDDHH) in Uruguay and twice attend the Hague Academy of International Law (with the two enrollments separated by over three decades). All of these experiences deepened my commitment to the field. My focus intensified around human rights issues, particularly the issue of what it means to be a citizen or national in the modern world, international mobility, statelessness and migration.

My journey into law began at the University of California, Berkeley, where I earned my law degree and focused on public international law. There, I first became fascinated by the intersection of law, social justice, and public policy. This passion led me to Harvard Divinity School, where I earned my Master of Theological Studies. My research at Harvard explored the impact of amicus briefs submitted by religious organizations on United States Supreme Court decisions regarding moral issues. Theological study complemented my legal education, underscoring my enduring commitment to justice from both philosophical and legal perspectives. My return to human rights was prompted by research into the fascinating administrative and constitutional issues surrounding nationality in Uruguay and its impact on statelessness.

Participation in this specialized European LL.M. program has significantly expanded my grasp of international legal frameworks and provided practical skills to navigate complex transnational issues effectively. Modules such as International Criminal Law, International Human Rights Law, and the Use of Force have given me a comprehensive view of global legal dynamics. Hands-on experiences at the Vienna International Center and interactions with UN experts have been invaluable, while guidance from esteemed professors further enriched my academic growth.

Notably, Dr. Otto Pfersmann, a leading scholar in legal theory and comparative constitutional law from the Panthéon-Sorbonne University, sharpened participants' legal argumentation, logic, and problem-solving skills. His extensive research on normative systems profoundly impacted my analytical approach. Professor Dr. Wolfgang Benedek provided practical perspectives grounded in extensive fieldwork, including OSCE missions in Ukraine and Belarus. His experiences in international human rights law and involvement with the European Training and Research Centre for Human Rights and Democracy (ETC Graz) offered invaluable real-world insights. Ambassador Bernardino Regazzoni, drawing from his tenure as Switzerland's Ambassador to France, guided critical debates on contemporary diplomatic issues, enriching discussions with his direct diplomatic experience.

Dr. Jane Hofbauer critically analyzed Europe's role within public international law, examining regional identities and ideological influences on international legal systems. Dr. Konrad Lachmayer, Vice Dean for Research, utilized a comparative legal methodology, offering varied case studies and perspectives to deepen our understanding of comparative constitutional developments. Werner Druml, leveraging his experience with the Austrian Ministry for European and International Affairs, clarified international organizations' inner workings and complexities.

Velina Chakarova, Director of the Austrian Institute for European and Security Policy, introduced robust theoretical frameworks in International Relations, bringing clarity and dynamism to discussions on realism, liberalism, and constructivism. Elisabeth Hoffberger-Pippan enriched our understanding of International Humanitarian Law, addressing contemporary issues like autonomous weapon systems and humanitarian access in armed conflicts, drawing upon her scholarly work on emerging military technologies.

My specific interests within international law are human rights, nationality, citizenship, and migration. My Master's Thesis at Sigmund Freud University proposes a comparative analysis of the Inter-American and European human rights systems regarding nationality, focusing on the recent Resolution 2/23 of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR), which establishes a mandatory right for long-term residents to naturalize, and the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) jurisprudence, which approaches nationality through the right to identity and private life under Article 8 of the European Convention. The thesis seeks to explore the evolving concept of nationality in international law, including its classical roots in state sovereignty and the Nottebohm case, the statelessness conventions, and the broader interpretations of nationality rights in both systems, emphasizing the innovative "right to naturalization" in the Inter-American System versus the more constrained approach of the European framework. I am deeply grateful to Dr. Konrad Lachmayer for supervising this dissertation research.

While I am in the middle of writing my Master’s Thesis, I am also currently developing a Ph.D. thesis examining the emerging global landscape where human rights protections for migrants risk regression amid growing movements towards closed borders, rejection of migrants, and restrictions on asylum. If the post-World War II human rights systems are in retreat, we must analyze how national and regional authorities respond to migration crises, particularly those driven by environmental change, and develop new frameworks for examining human rights, might be, and develop ways to analyze human rights in a new international order.

My extensive legal practice, diverse academic background, and integrated philosophical and legal approach—combined with my technological proficiency and insights into artificial intelligence—uniquely position me within the field of international law.

I encourage others interested in an immersive one-year European LL.M. program with direct engagement with the UN system to explore this exceptional opportunity. I welcome any inquiries about the program and look forward to sharing my research on master's and Ph.D. thesis proposals. Through mutual exchange and intellectual challenge, we grow stronger and more insightful in our research.

Many thanks to Julian Caletti at UNITAR, who inspires so many, and to Dr. Henrikka Hannula for her tireless direction.

The Text of the Proyecto de Ley is Available in Multiple Formats

The full text of the proposed law on nationality is now available online in HTML, as PDF for download, and as a flipbook. This law interprets the Constitution in the manner suggested by Alberto Pérez Pérez and brings Uruguay’s interpretation into conformity with the American Convention and international law.

• Full text online (HTML)

• PDF

• Flipbook

A Draft of a Constitutionally Valid Proposed Law on Nationality and Citizenship in Uruguay

Various commentators in Uruguay have indicated that the Uruguayan State can only comply with its treaty commitments to provide the stateless a path to nationality and allow long-term residents to become nationals by holding a “plebiscite.” I propose that following Uruguay’s domestic Constitutional interpretative methodology does not require a plebiscite or a Constitutional amendment. I have drafted a model law implementing the right to nationality through interpretative legislation. I encourage you to review it and determine whether this draft interpretative law violates any terms of the Uruguayan Constitution. A table of the various Constitutional provisions concerning citizenship and nationality is included in the document for ease of reference.

Before starting the review, it is crucial to remember that the Inter-American Human Rights Commission provided the standard definition of nationality accepted in international law in Resolution 2/23. It is also essential to recall that the Uruguayan State provides immigrants with voting rights, which it calls citizenship, but denies the stateless and all long-term residents any path to nationality whatsoever.

NATIONALITY: It is the fundamental human right that establishes the essential legal bond between a person and the State, by virtue of which a person belongs to the political community that a State constitutes under domestic and international law. This link allows acquiring and exercising rights and responsibilities inherent to belonging to a political community. Furthermore, it is a non-derogable right in accordance with Article 27 of the American Convention on Human Rights. Some countries use the word nationality, while others refer to the word citizenship to denote this legal bond. In international human rights law, both terms are used interchangeably.

The full draft law, a statement of motives, a consolidated draft of Law 16.021 showing the changes made, an academic review of the basis for the interpretative law, an FAQ or question-and-answer section on its impacts, and a table of constitutional provisions are included in the document published here:

https://www.nacionalidad.uy/downloads/Proyecto_Ley_Andrew_Nacionalidad_Oct2024.pdf

The proposed "Restoration and Modernization of Uruguayan Nationality and Citizenship Law" aims to reform Uruguay's nationality framework to address ambiguities in distinguishing between natural and legal citizens and to align with international human rights standards. Key elements include:

1. Clarification of Nationality: All citizens, natural or legal, are recognized as nationals. Nationality equates to being Uruguayan and applies uniformly to all citizens.

2. Descent Rights: Children of citizens, regardless of birthplace, may inherit nationality. Legal citizens' foreign-born children are also granted rights to claim nationality upon meeting residency requirements.

3. Constitutional Interpretation: Articles 74 and 81 are reinterpreted to clarify legal residency and nationality transmission.

4. Clarification of Dual Nationality: Citizens may retain Uruguayan nationality when acquiring another nationality, although dual nationals lose political rights (like voting) if they naturalize abroad.

5. Standardization of Identification Documents: Official documents must uniformly reflect Uruguayan nationality, reducing issues in international travel and diplomatic protection.

6. International Compliance: The law aligns with international norms to prevent statelessness, protect children's rights to nationality, and fulfill treaty obligations.

The Statement of Motives explains that the proposed law addresses critical ambiguities in Uruguay's Constitution regarding nationality and citizenship, especially the need for more clarity in distinguishing between citizenship and the modern concept of nationality. These issues have led to actual harm, including denying nationality to legal citizens and those found to be stateless, which affects access to identification, travel, and diplomatic protections. Additionally, the current framework contravenes Uruguay's commitments under international human rights law, as it fails to protect against statelessness and does not ensure the right to nationality for all citizens.

Historically, Uruguay’s interpretation, influenced by legal scholar Justino Jiménez de Arechaga, has viewed nationality as applicable only to natural citizens. This has left legal citizens in a “gray zone” without full recognition as nationals. This has caused significant issues, such as the misidentification of Uruguayan citizens as foreigners in official documents, including passports, resulting in travel difficulties and the denial of fundamental rights. Fortunately, Alberto Pérez Pérez, perhaps Uruguay’s most well-respected international lawyer, published an entirely different interpretation of the Uruguayan Constitution, opening two competing interpretative schools with differing opinions on whether the current Constitutional text classifies legal citizens as “foreigners.”

The law aims to correct these injustices by reinterpreting constitutional articles to recognize all citizens as nationals and ensure equal treatment across various legal and social domains. This includes enabling children of both natural and legal citizens to inherit nationality regardless of birthplace, aligning Uruguayan nationality law with international human rights obligations, and addressing longstanding discrimination and obstacles legal citizens and the stateless in Uruguay face. The statement emphasizes that this reform is necessary not only to uphold democratic values but also to ensure Uruguay’s legal obligations are met and to protect the dignity and rights of all its citizens.

The English translation of Law 16.021, as it would stand if amended by the proposed interpretative law, is provided here for you to look over.

Law Nº 16.021
Amended by the RESTORATION AND MODERNIZATION LAW OF URUGUAYAN NATIONALITY AND CITIZENSHIP

Article 1

All citizens of Uruguay are nationals of the Oriental Republic of Uruguay. The condition of Uruguayan nationality is synonymous and interchangeable with the condition of being Oriental.

Article 2
If one of their parents is or was a natural Uruguayan citizen born in Uruguay, a legal citizen of Uruguay, or a citizen of Uruguay who established residence in Uruguay and registered in the Civic Registry at any time before the birth of the child, such a child of any national of Uruguay, also known as Oriental, born anywhere, is considered a national of the Oriental Republic of Uruguay and has the right to become a natural citizen. The citizenship rights corresponding to being natural citizens of Uruguay are available to children born abroad only by the fact of settling in the country and registering in the Civic Registry upon reaching or after reaching the age of 18.

Article 3
The minor child of a legal citizen born before the granting of the citizenship certificate is considered a national of Uruguay unless they choose to retain a previous nationality and make this choice as prescribed by law or regulation.

• A) Such choice may be made by the joint decision of the child's parents or guardians and only if the child possesses at least one other nationality.

• B) The act of becoming a national of Uruguay under this section for such a child does not require the renunciation of any previous nationality or nationalities.

• C) Any child subject to this section may obtain the status of a legal citizen of Uruguay and the rights of citizenship upon reaching or after reaching the age of 18 by residing in the country and registering in the Civic Registry.

Article 4
It is interpreted that Article 74 and 81 of the Constitution of the Republic should be understood as settlement being the performance of acts that unequivocally demonstrate the person's intention in that regard, such as, for example:

• A) Staying in the country for a period exceeding three months.

• B) Renting, promising to acquire, or acquiring a property to live in.

• C) Establishing a business or industry.

• D) Obtaining employment in the public or private sector.

• E) Enrolling and attending a public or private educational institution for a minimum period of two months.

• F) Any other similar act demonstrating the aforementioned intention.

Article 5
[Maintains its current wording according to Law No. 19.362]
The justification of the required conditions in the preceding Article 4 shall be made before the Electoral Court, which, once it verifies the fulfillment of at least two of the requirements (literals A, B, C, D, E, or F), shall proceed without further delay to the registration in the corresponding register.

Article 6
To ensure the rights arising from the previous articles, the identification documents (identity card and passport) of all Uruguayan nationals, whether natural citizens, legal citizens, or children of such citizens with Uruguayan nationality according to this law, must indicate the Uruguayan nationality, using the same name, representation, or international identification code, although the type of citizenship or the nature of the nationality may be specified further in notes if space is available.

Article 7
Nothing in this law shall be interpreted as affecting the distinctions between natural citizens and legal citizens found in the Constitution of the Oriental Republic of Uruguay, except as specifically provided in this law. Without limitation, those distinctions not affected by this law are those found in Articles 90, 98, 235, 242, 245, 247, and 264.

Article 8
The granting of a letter of citizenship to an individual applying to be recognized as a legal citizen of Uruguay under Article 75 of the Constitution may be denied based on the conditions set forth in Article 80 of the Constitution. This denial of legal citizenship based on the elements of Article 80 is permitted even though Article 80 describes the conditions under which the citizenship rights for those who already possess natural and legal citizenship may be suspended. Article 75 is interpreted as incorporating the same criteria established in Article 80.

Article 9
The rights here identified as citizenship rights are identified as the right to vote actively and passively originating from registration in the Civic Registry.

• A) Citizenship rights are subject to Article 75(c) in which it is established that these citizenship rights are exercisable by legal citizens three years after the granting of the citizenship certificate.

• B) Article 80 is interpreted here as describing the suspension of citizenship rights and not the suspension of nationality status.

Article 10
The condition of being a national of Uruguay is never lost by a natural citizen through subsequent naturalization in another nation, although citizenship rights are lost at the time of such naturalization. Citizenship rights for natural citizens who subsequently naturalize can be recovered by establishing residence in the Republic and registering in the Civic Registry.

Article 11
The status of being a national of Uruguay is never lost for a legal citizen through subsequent naturalization in another nation, although the citizenship rights derived from legal citizenship are lost at the time of such naturalization. The citizenship rights for legal citizens who subsequently naturalize can be recovered by establishing residence in the Republic and registering in the Civic Registry.

Article 12
Because every person has the right to a nationality and the right to change nationality, the status of being a national of Uruguay can be voluntarily renounced in a manner prescribed by law or regulation.

• A) The renunciation of Uruguayan nationality includes the loss of citizenship rights corresponding to the status of natural citizenship. The renunciation of Uruguayan nationality will not serve as a prohibition for such individuals to seek recognition as legal citizens subject to the Constitution and laws of Uruguay.

• B) The renunciation of legal citizenship, whether carried out by a renunciation effected by law or regulation, or by a subsequent act of naturalization, includes the loss of citizenship rights corresponding to the status of legal citizenship. The renunciation of Uruguayan nationality shall not serve as a prohibition for such individuals to seek recognition as legal citizens subject to the Constitution and laws of Uruguay.

• C) Uruguay will only accept the renunciation upon substantial evidence, as determined by law or regulation, that the natural or legal citizen seeking to renounce has obtained or will obtain a nationality that will be in effect or will come into effect at the time of the renunciation of Uruguayan nationality.

Article 13
This law shall come into force from the date of its promulgation by the Executive Power.

The Evolution of Private International Law: Addressing Global Challenges in Environmental and Human Rights Accountability

Introduction: The Metamorphoses of Private International Law Exemplified

I have greatly benefited from the General Course presented by Professor Haris Pamboukis in the Summer Course on Private International Law at the Hague Academy of International Law. Although we still have one week left in the General Course, titled "Metamorphoses of Private International Law," we have already begun to explore in the directed studies program how recent metamorphoses in private international law (PIL) manifest in efforts to eliminate or mitigate environmental harm and human rights abuses by private actors.

PIL has undergone profound transformations over recent decades, evolving from a narrow field focused on conflicts of laws into a dynamic and complex discipline that addresses the legal challenges of globalization. As Professor Pamboukis describes, this evolution is marked by the “metamorphosis” of its foundational principles, methods, and the very nature of the legal relationships it governs. The traditional framework of PIL, which was once primarily concerned with determining the applicable law in cases involving foreign elements, has expanded to include broader considerations of jurisdiction, the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments, and the interplay between national and international legal orders.

The General Course emphasizes that the modern landscape of PIL is characterized by a more nuanced approach to legal issues that transcend borders. So far, the course has illustrated how PIL now operates within a context of increasing socio-legal complexity, where legal relationships are influenced by a multitude of national, international, and transnational factors. This shift reflects a broader trend in legal scholarship and practice, where law is no longer seen as a static set of rules but as a living, evolving system that must adapt to the realities of a globalized world.

Metamorphoses in Private International Law: A Dynamic Evolution

In the General Course, Professor Pamboukis deliberately uses the term “metamorphoses” in relation to private international law (PIL). We must first pause to consider what this term means and why these changes have occurred. Understanding the nature of these transformations and the reasons for legal evolution is crucial.

Traditionally, PIL has been concerned with resolving conflicts between different legal systems. However, it has undergone significant transformation over time. This metamorphosis is not merely a historical event but an ongoing process that reflects the law's dynamic and responsive nature to societal shifts, technological advancements, and the increasing interconnectedness of global communities. Professor Pamboukis argues that these metamorphoses are crucial for understanding the current and future trajectories of PIL.

One might characterize the metamorphosis of PIL by its transition from a narrow focus on conflicts of law to a broader, more nuanced field that now encompasses issues such as the recognition of foreign judgments and the determination of international competence. This expansion reflects the growing complexity of international legal relationships and the need for a more comprehensive framework to address them. The metamorphoses of PIL have been driven by the imperative to ensure coherence and fairness in a world where legal systems increasingly interact and overlap.

These transformations in PIL are not confined to a specific historical moment but are part of an ongoing process. The changes observed in PIL are both reflective of past developments and anticipatory of future challenges. Professor Pamboukis highlights that PIL must continue to evolve to address emerging issues such as artificial intelligence and the globalization of social norms. This forward-looking approach underscores the necessity for PIL to remain adaptable and responsive to new realities.

The metamorphoses in PIL are deeply intertwined with broader philosophical and theoretical shifts. Professor Pamboukis emphasizes the importance of understanding the "general theory" of PIL, which must adapt to the socio-sacred changes within society. This adaptation is itself a metamorphosis, requiring legal principles and methods to transform to meet the demands of contemporary society. The evolution of PIL is thus not only a technical or procedural change but also a transformation in its underlying philosophical and theoretical foundations.

Beyond these broad transformations, Professor Pamboukis also identifies "micro-metamorphoses" within the field of PIL. These are the smaller, incremental changes that occur within the larger framework of legal revolutions. Such micro-metamorphoses contribute to the overall evolution of the law, ensuring that it remains relevant and effective in addressing specific issues as they arise. These smaller changes are essential to the broader metamorphosis of PIL, as they reflect the law's ability to adapt to nuanced and often unforeseen challenges.

The concept of metamorphosis in PIL is not only a reflection of legal changes but also of societal transformation. Law, particularly PIL, is portrayed as a mirror of broader societal shifts, evolving as society itself evolves. As cultural, political, and technological changes occur, so too must the law undergo metamorphosis to remain pertinent and just. This dynamic relationship between law and society underscores the importance of understanding the factors that drive legal change.

Environmental Harm and Human Rights Violations

In light of these developments, Professor Jacco Bomhoff and Professor Fabien Marchadier, who lead the directed studies seminars, suggested several cases and a legal commentary for participants to consider these shifts in PIL, particularly in the context of corporate responsibility for environmental damage and human rights violations. These materials reinforce my belief that the changes in PIL's methods and principles are opening new avenues for holding multinational corporations accountable for their global impacts. Recent cases, along with the broader doctrinal shifts found in regulations, directives, and commentaries, illustrate the ongoing metamorphosis of the discipline and its increasing relevance in a globalized legal landscape.

Recent Case Law and Doctrinal Shifts

Recent judicial decisions demonstrate a growing flexibility in the application of choice of law rules. For example, in Das v. George Weston Limited, the Ontario Court of Appeal considered corporate policy decisions made in Canada as potential "events giving rise to the damage" under the Rome II Regulation. This case, despite ultimately applying Bangladeshi law, reflects an emerging willingness to adapt traditional PIL methodologies to the complexities of global supply chains. Similarly, the landmark case of Milieudefensie et al. v. Royal Dutch Shell plc marks a significant departure from conventional jurisdictional limitations. The Dutch court’s decision to impose global emissions reduction obligations on Royal Dutch Shell illustrates a broader judicial recognition of the interconnected nature of multinational corporate operations.

These cases also underscore the evolving challenge of defining "damage" in the context of transnational disputes, particularly those related to climate change and human rights violations. Traditional legal categories often struggle to accommodate the novel issues that arise from global corporate activities. As seen in both Das and Royal Dutch Shell, courts are increasingly rethinking these categories to better address the complexities of modern litigation.

In parallel with these doctrinal shifts, there has been a noticeable increase in "foreign direct liability" claims, where plaintiffs seek to hold parent companies accountable for the actions of their subsidiaries abroad. The Royal Dutch Shell case exemplifies this trend, leveraging evolving PIL doctrines concerning parent company liability and the duty of care. This case, alongside Das, illustrates a broader move towards recognizing novel theories of duty of care that reflect the realities of global corporate operations. In these instances, the courts recognized duties of care based on the parent company’s ability to influence group-wide policies, signaling a shift towards more robust accountability mechanisms.

Another significant development is the assertion of extraterritorial regulatory authority by domestic courts. The Royal Dutch Shell ruling, which imposed group-wide emissions reduction obligations, is a prime example of how courts are utilizing PIL techniques to extend the reach of national regulations beyond traditional territorial boundaries. This shift not only reflects the increasing influence of PIL in regulating global corporate behavior but also highlights the growing importance of these legal mechanisms in addressing transnational issues.

However, the expansion of extraterritorial regulatory structures in PIL and the diversity in PIL approaches across jurisdictions do have negative consequences. In some ways, the classical conception of PIL as seeking harmonization has given way to more unilateral extraterritorial solutions. While beneficial for achieving justice, this has led to increased opportunities for forum shopping and regulatory arbitrage. Plaintiffs, seeking to hold corporations accountable for environmental and human rights violations, may strategically select jurisdictions with more favorable PIL doctrines, while corporations may attempt to structure their operations in jurisdictions with more lenient liability regimes.

Legislative Innovations and Extraterritorial Application

These doctrinal shifts and strategic developments are further illustrated by recent legislative innovations, such as the EU Directive 2024/1760 on corporate sustainability due diligence and the French Corporate Duty of Vigilance Law. The EU Directive represents a transformative shift in corporate accountability legislation, introducing standardized causes of action for failures in environmental and human rights due diligence across EU member states. By extending the territorial reach of EU law and providing a unified framework, the directive simplifies forum selection and prevents companies from evading liability by operating under more lenient jurisdictions.

In contrast, the French Corporate Duty of Vigilance Law adopts a narrower focus, applying primarily to companies registered in France that meet specific employee thresholds. While this law mandates the establishment of vigilance plans to manage human rights and environmental risks, it lacks explicit provisions on applicable law, potentially leading to inconsistencies in cross-border cases. The comparison between these two legislative approaches highlights the broader and more comprehensive scope of the EU Directive, which addresses many of the challenges traditionally associated with transnational litigation in human rights and environmental protection.

This trend towards the extraterritorial application of domestic laws is also evident in other areas, such as data protection. The General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) exemplifies this by extending its reach to data controllers and processors outside the EU, provided they offer goods or services to, or monitor the behavior of, data subjects within the EU. This regulatory approach, which prioritizes the location of affected individuals over the domicile of the corporate entity, signifies a significant departure from traditional territorial principles in PIL.

Conclusion: Stewards of Continued Natural Metamorphoses

Franz Kafka wrote The Metamorphosis in 1915, presenting a narrative where the protagonist, Gregor Samsa, undergoes a surreal, unnatural, and alienating transformation that starkly contrasts with the metamorphosis found in nature. Biological metamorphosis is a natural, often positive, and purposeful change that typically leads to a more advanced or mature stage in an organism's life. This transformation is integral to the organism's survival and adaptation, enhancing its ability to thrive in its environment.

In contrast, the Kafkaesque metamorphosis experienced by Gregor is sudden, inexplicable, and contrary to the natural order, emphasizing the absurdity of his situation. Instead of leading to growth or adaptation, Gregor's transformation results in profound alienation, the loss of his identity, and the disintegration of his relationships, ultimately leading to his demise.

As we consider the ongoing metamorphoses of Private International Law (PIL), it is crucial that those of us who research, teach, and practice in the field of PIL provide the necessary space and conditions for a natural evolution of the law. Such an evolution will enable PIL to adapt effectively and serve even greater needs, ensuring that it remains a force for coherence, fairness, and justice in an increasingly complex world. We must avoid allowing PIL to suffer a fate reminiscent of Kafka's narrative—losing its very identity in a more fragmented global order, leading to isolated and alienated legal systems, and the disintegration of comity and mutual international respect for competing legal systems.

The natural evolution of private international law in the context of corporate accountability signals a broader realignment of the relationships between global business, state sovereignty, and individual rights. As PIL doctrines continue to adapt to the challenges posed by complex corporate structures and new forms of transnational harm, they are likely to play an increasingly important role in shaping the future of corporate accountability for environmental damage and human rights violations. By examining these changes in environmental accountability and human rights protection, we can clearly see the dynamic nature of PIL and its critical role in addressing the multifaceted challenges posed by global corporate activities.

I have undergone a transformation in perspective over the last two weeks. This transformation includes a reimagination of PIL, often viewed as a more limited vehicle for international governance compared to public international law, as a powerful tool for international governance. Shifting my focus from classical concepts, such as obtaining broadly equivalent results regardless of the jurisdiction, to functional concepts, such as preventing transnational actors from escaping liability through the myriad legal systems and jurisdictions, suggests that PIL is likely a strong tool for not only allowing various legal systems to communicate in a just manner, ensuring fairness across jurisdictions, but also for issues of public justice and protection.

Transcripción no oficial del discurso del Ministro Omar Paganini en la 54ª Asamblea General de la OEA

Señor Presidente, Canciller de Honduras.

Señor Secretario General, Embajador Luis Almagro.

Señor Secretario General Adjunto, Embajador Néstor Méndez. Señores Cancilleres y Jefes de Delegación. Señores Representantes Permanentes. Representantes de organizaciones de la sociedad civil, señoras y señores.

Uruguay celebra la realización de este nuevo período de sesiones de la Asamblea General en esta hermana ciudad de Asunción, agradeciendo la hospitalidad con la cual nos recibe el pueblo paraguayo. A quienes felicito por la organización y el trato que nos han deparado.

Nuestro país valora enormemente este espacio en un contexto de importantes desafíos que afectan a nuestra región y al mundo entero. En tal sentido, celebramos que el tema de esta edición aluda a la integración y seguridad para el desarrollo sostenible de la región y que este intercambio propicie una reflexión profunda sobre los complejos desafíos que nuestra región enfrenta, para debatir de manera abierta y franca sobre los diversos obstáculos que impactan en el desarrollo de nuestras sociedades.

Entendemos que dichos retos deben ser atendidos desde una visión integral en el marco del respeto a los derechos humanos y las libertades fundamentales, considerando especialmente a aquellas personas que se encuentran en una situación de especial vulnerabilidad.

Expresamos nuestra profunda preocupación por las crisis interrelacionadas que enfrentamos: la crisis climática, los conflictos internacionales, las distracciones en los mercados y en la logística que producen, y la pandemia que ha afectado negativamente avances en materia de desarrollo sostenible, entre otras cosas, afectando los procesos para erradicar la pobreza, combatir la desigualdad y lograr la prosperidad de nuestros pueblos.

También nos preocupa el avance e internacionalización del crimen organizado, un fenómeno que está impactando en la vida cotidiana de nuestra gente. Es una región que lamentablemente se vuelve violenta. Solo con esfuerzos coordinados entre nuestros estados se puede atacar este problema que es cada vez más desafiante.

En materia de acción climática, Uruguay comparte con los países de la región el objetivo primordial de hacer frente a las vulnerabilidades generadas como consecuencia del cambio climático para garantizar así un futuro sustentable a nuestros respectivos países y sus próximas generaciones. También entendemos que es necesario tomar acción conjunta para combatir las causas de este cambio climático.

Por eso deseamos recordar que es a través de un flujo estable y permanente de recursos financieros y asistencia técnica que la región podrá llevar adelante la tan necesaria transición energética hacia fuentes de energía limpia, mitigando de esta manera las emisiones de gases de efecto invernadero y destinando también recursos para la adaptación al cambio climático. En este sentido, cabe mencionar que en nuestro país, en un año de lluvias normales, el 97% de la demanda eléctrica está siendo cubierta por energías renovables.

El proceso de transformación energética debe seguir y debe universalizarse, y eso cuesta dinero y requiere fondos y financiamiento.

Señor Presidente, Uruguay se encuentra fuertemente comprometido con el respeto de los valores democráticos, los cuales resultan imprescindibles para la estabilidad, la paz duradera y el desarrollo sostenible de nuestras naciones. En tal sentido, no podemos dejar de mencionar nuestra preocupación por los casos de apartamiento de los principios y valores de la Carta de nuestra organización y de la Carta Democrática Interamericana.

Nos preocupa especialmente la situación en Venezuela, un proceso de democratización que entendíamos se podía impulsar a partir de los acuerdos desbarbados, pero que lamentablemente se viene apartando de lo que puede considerarse un proceso transparente y competitivo. Cuando vemos la restricción a candidatos a presentarse, el amedrentamiento y la persecución política de las personas, y donde vemos con preocupación el próximo evento electoral del 28 de julio, que ojalá resulte en un proceso de avance hacia la democratización y no en una manipulación desde el poder para meramente legitimar un régimen autoritario.

Como integrante de la comunidad de naciones del hemisferio, también queremos elevar nuestra voz sobre la situación en Nicaragua, que todos reconocemos como un régimen autoritario que persigue a disidentes, no respeta el Estado de derecho y al haberse apartado de esta organización, su pueblo cuenta con menos apoyos para presionar al régimen hacia un proceso de democratización.

Por supuesto, y así lo hemos manifestado, nos preocupan todos los desvíos del orden democrático y en particular el intento de golpe de Estado de ayer en la hermana república de Bolivia que condenamos enérgicamente, como todas las naciones hermanas lo hicieron de manera ejemplar y en un tiempo francamente ha sido un ejemplo. La acción democrática decidida e inmediata, seguramente fue una importante parte para frenar el proceso de ruptura del orden democrático que se intentó allí.

Subrayamos la necesidad de redoblar esfuerzos para fortalecer la democracia y consolidar el Estado de derecho en nuestro hemisferio. Solo mediante la plena vigencia del orden democrático, los estados de nuestra región pueden lograr una mayor promoción de la cohesión social, alentar el desarrollo económico y garantizar las libertades fundamentales y el ejercicio de los derechos de los ciudadanos. En este sentido, entendemos que una ciudadanía comprometida e informada, capaz de participar activamente en los procesos democráticos y tomar decisiones fundamentales, resulta vital para hacer frente a los complejos desafíos del presente.

Asimismo, para fomentar la convivencia democrática, es necesario condenar todas las formas de discriminación y las expresiones de intolerancia como el racismo, la xenofobia y el antisemitismo, que lamentablemente estamos viendo intensificarse en nuestro hemisferio.

Señor Presidente, Uruguay está firmemente involucrado con la organización en temas emergentes que afectan la seguridad de nuestros países: las emergencias sanitarias, el combate al cambio climático y el impacto multidimensional de las nuevas tecnologías, por ejemplo sobre el mundo del trabajo o en lo que respecta a la ciberseguridad, así como el uso de la inteligencia artificial.

Como tradicionalmente lo hemos hecho, seguiremos constructivamente estrechando lazos con esta organización y con sus Estados miembros para asegurar el desarrollo de nuestra gente en un marco de libertad de manera inclusiva y resiliente, lo que nuestro Presidente ha dado en llamar libertad responsable. 

Muchas gracias.

La Opinión Parlamentaria del Dr. Jaime Rubén Sapolinski, la Dra. Claudia Arrigo y la Dra. Micaela Prieto sobre la acionalidad uruguaya: argumentum ad antiquitatem

Hay momentos en que encontramos documentos largos que, a primera vista, parecen eruditos. Sin embargo, tras reflexionarlos y examinarlos con metodologías rigurosas y principios de lógica y argumentación simples, la apariencia de autoridad puede evaporarse de documentos aparentemente complejos. A menudo nos damos cuenta de que la complejidad era solo una distracción de la falta de sustancia o apoyo para las posiciones reclamadas.

Tal es el caso con una opinión proporcionada por el Dr. Jaime Rubén Sapolinski, la Dra. Claudia Arrigo y la Dra. Micaela Prieto, profesores de la facultad de derecho de la Universidad de la República. Estos tres distinguidos profesores de derecho presentaron su opinión el 31 de octubre de 2023 al Comité de Constitución, Códigos, Legislación General y Administración en relación con un proyecto de ley titulado "Libertad de Circulación para Ciudadanos Legales Uruguayos."

El Dr. Sapolinski y sus colegas afirman una falacia al considerar como un hecho constitucional que la nacionalidad uruguaya se adquiere únicamente por nacimiento en el territorio. Sin embargo, su "opinión" se apoya principalmente en referencias a interpretaciones tradicionales u opiniones legales históricas sin evidencia contemporánea o razonamiento.

La opinión se presenta sin un apoyo o evidencia sustancial y se basa principalmente en afirmaciones históricas o creencias tradicionales. Este tipo de argumento se conoce como apelación a la tradición o argumentum ad antiquitatem. Afirma que algo es verdadero o correcto simplemente porque siempre se ha creído así, sin proporcionar evidencia concreta o razonamiento para apoyar la afirmación.

Esta falacia sostiene que algo es correcto o mejor porque es antiguo o siempre se ha hecho de esa manera. Se basa en la premisa de que el precedente histórico es suficiente para justificar la veracidad de la afirmación. Tal argumento no proporciona evidencia empírica ni razonamiento lógico, sino que se apoya en la idea de que "siempre ha sido así". Este tipo de argumento se refiere a las creencias o prácticas de personas del pasado como si consagraran y hicieran reales errores de lógica y fallos en la discriminación étnica simplemente porque son antiguos. Sapolinski y sus colegas cometen este error y buscan confundir al público y a los legisladores sugiriendo simplemente que la aceptación prolongada de una idea es prueba de su validez.

Tomemos en serio el intento del Dr. Sapolinski de construir una defensa de la actual negación de la nacionalidad a los ciudadanos legales uruguayos. El Dr. Sapolinski y sus colegas postulan que la Constitución uruguaya distingue claramente entre nacionalidad y ciudadanía. Según su interpretación, la nacionalidad se adquiere por nacimiento en el territorio, mientras que la ciudadanía es un estatus que permite la participación en derechos cívicos, como votar y ocupar cargos públicos. El concepto de "ciudadanía natural" se refiere a los individuos nacidos en Uruguay, mientras que la "ciudadanía legal" puede ser adquirida por extranjeros a través de la residencia y el registro, pero no confiere nacionalidad. Argumentan que el marco legal uruguayo no prevé la naturalización como medio para adquirir la nacionalidad. La constitución no permite la naturalización, lo que impide que los ciudadanos legales se conviertan en nacionales. Los ciudadanos legales, incluso aquellos que adquieren la ciudadanía voluntariamente, no pueden ser considerados nacionales ya que las normas constitucionales no apoyan esto. Sustentan sus argumentos con la opinión de distinguidos juristas como Justino Jiménez de Aréchaga, quien interpretó la Constitución en el sentido de que la nacionalidad se adquiere estrictamente por nacimiento en el territorio y no puede obtenerse a través de la naturalización o ciudadanía legal. Sin embargo, no hay análisis alguno de cómo Jiménez de Aréchaga llegó a esa conclusión. Se acepta por fe.

Supuestamente, tales doctrinas prestigiosas dentro del derecho constitucional uruguayo mantienen consistentemente la separación entre nacionalidad (vinculada al nacimiento) y ciudadanía legal (que puede adquirirse a través de la residencia y otras condiciones).

Sabemos que la Constitución en su texto no habla de nacionalidad excepto para indicar, a través de una adición de 1934, que no se pierde por naturalización posterior. La ciudadanía legal, según esta adición de ese año, se pierde por naturalización posterior. De lo contrario, la Constitución solo habla de ciudadanos naturales y ciudadanos legales. No hay nada más y nada menos. La opinión presentada al Parlamento es en su mayoría humo y espejos para cubrir este hecho.

¿Qué hechos ofrece la opinión para apoyar la afirmación de que solo los ciudadanos naturales son nacionales? El Dr. Sapolinski y sus coautores señalan que el sistema legal uruguayo no prevé un mecanismo de naturalización que permita a un extranjero convertirse en nacional. Esta ausencia, afirman, apoya la conclusión de que la nacionalidad está reservada para aquellos nacidos en el territorio.

Podemos responder que es obvio que el sistema legal uruguayo no prevé actualmente un mecanismo de naturalización. Eso se debe a la opinión infundada y sin apoyo de académicos como Justino Jiménez de Aréchaga, no a la Constitución misma.

Todo se reduce a una afirmación de que ciertos conceptos están "implícitamente" consagrados en la Constitución, aunque según los autores es "confusa". Sapolinski y los coautores usan palabras como "evidente." Cuando los argumentos constitucionales que deberían basarse en una metodología rigurosa se reducen a conceptos que son implícitamente evidentes y no objetivamente demostrables, deberíamos estar nerviosos.

¿Por qué importa? El Dr. Sapolinski excluye con gusto a los ciudadanos legales, que aparentemente están "naturalizados" porque están sujetos a "naturalización posterior", de la nación. Los ciudadanos legales no están, dice, dentro del "protectorado de compatriotas que otorga el Estado." Los ciudadanos legales, según la opinión, no participan en la vida colectiva de la nación, de la cual los autores los expulsan.

El Dr. Sapolinski es un defensor acérrimo de esta distinción, afirmando que "uno es nacional por el hecho de nacer en el territorio” y “luego, el legislador se tomó algunas libertades alrededor de este tema y amplió el universo más allá de lo previsto por la Carta Magna." Lo que quiere decir con esto es que la Ley Nº 16021, la Ley Nº 18858 y la Ley Nº 19362 otorgaron "nacionalidad" más allá de los límites de la Constitución. Los hijos de uruguayos nacidos en el extranjero y los nietos deben tener cuidado de que fundamentalistas como el Dr. Sapolinski y sus coautores no lleguen algún día a controlar la reversión de estas leyes. Si lo hacen, los ciudadanos legales no serán los únicos ciudadanos a los que se les niegue el derecho a ser protegidos por el Estado y a participar en la vida de la nación.

En resumen, la opinión es vacía, ilógica, sin apoyo y un ejemplo clásico de argumentum ad antiquitatem. La mejor estrategia cuando se nos presenta tal argumentación es seguir adelante sin necesidad de refutarla. Los asuntos de fe, en comparación con los debates académicos, no pueden ser cambiados por la razón. Tal vez lo máximo que podemos esperar hacer es identificar este tipo de argumento y separarlo de futuros discursos respetados sobre el tema.

He argumentado en un artículo publicado en una revista jurídica y en otros foros que los ciudadanos legales uruguayos (ciudadanos naturalizados) deben ser considerados nacionales de Uruguay. Al hacerlo, enfatizo la necesidad de emplear un método lógico-sistemático-teleológico para la interpretación constitucional, que implica verificar la claridad del texto constitucional, considerar el contexto dentro de todo el marco constitucional y comprender la intención teleológica (orientada a los fines) de las disposiciones constitucionales. He señalado que interpretaciones previas estaban influenciadas por nociones obsoletas de etnicidad y raza y no se adherían a esta metodología rigurosa.

Una de las falacias más importantes expuestas en la opinión presentada al Parlamento concierne al artículo 81 de la Constitución actual, que establece que la nacionalidad no se pierde por naturalización en otro país y diferencia entre ciudadanos naturales y legales. La redacción confusa del artículo ha llevado a malas interpretaciones, y el artículo puede interpretarse fácilmente como otorgando nacionalidad tanto a ciudadanos naturales como legales. Cuando examinamos las disposiciones constitucionales históricas, vemos que la Constitución de 1830 equiparaba ciudadanía con nacionalidad, la Constitución de 1918 reiteraba la pérdida de ciudadanía por naturalización pero proporcionaba un camino para recuperarla, y la Constitución de 1934 introdujo la distinción entre la suspensión de derechos de ciudadanía y la retención de la nacionalidad. La confianza en Justino Jiménez de Aréchaga está fuera de lugar porque no estableció ninguna metodología rigurosa en su interpretación de nacionalidad y ciudadanía y en su lugar se basó en esencialismo racial y étnico.

Pero no estoy solo en decidir que es hora de ignorar y sortear argumentos como los presentados por el Dr. Sapolinski y sus colegas que firmaron la opinión. No estoy solo porque el Dr. Sapolinski y otros académicos constitucionales ignoran por completo el derecho internacional de los derechos humanos, la Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos y la doctrina del control de convencionalidad.

Bajo el control de convencionalidad, vinculante para Uruguay a través de su solemne compromiso estatal, el argumento presentado en la opinión es irrelevante. El Dr. Sapolinski y los demás presentan un escenario de "si es cara, los ciudadanos legales ganan; si es cruz, los ciudadanos legales también ganan". Si la Constitución respaldara la discriminación y la violación del derecho fundamental e inderogable a la nacionalidad, reconocido explícitamente por la Comisión Interamericana de Derechos Humanos, Uruguay estaría obligado a ignorar y hacer inoperantes tales disposiciones hasta que la Constitución se modificara para conformarse al derecho internacional.

El Dr. Martín Risso Ferrand también proporcionó una respuesta a la Comisión de Constitución, Legislación General y Administración de la Cámara de Representantes, abordando el proyecto de "libertad de circulación de los ciudadanos legales uruguayos". Reconoció las imprecisiones técnicas en la Constitución uruguaya respecto a la nacionalidad y la ciudadanía, lo que ha llevado a varias teorías doctrinales. Sin embargo, Risso Ferrand enfatizó que estas discusiones se han vuelto estériles y que la alineación de la Constitución con el Derecho Internacional de los Derechos Humanos, particularmente la Convención Americana, exige interpretaciones que favorezcan la más amplia protección de los derechos.

El Dr. Sapolinski y sus coautores parecen haber escrito casi ocho páginas de texto sin mencionar una sola vez el requisito de que la interpretación que están defendiendo debe cumplir con los estándares internacionales de derechos humanos. No es opcional. El vacío completo en la opinión de Sapolinski sobre este tema es tanto revelador como perturbador.

El Dr. Risso Ferrand lo hace mucho mejor al alinear a Uruguay con los estándares internacionales. Apoyó el enfoque de la nueva ley propuesta para resolver los problemas que enfrentan los ciudadanos legales uruguayos en el extranjero, que encuentran dificultades para usar documentos uruguayos. La ley propuesta otorgaría a los ciudadanos legales los mismos derechos y prerrogativas que a los nacionales para identificación, protección diplomática y libre circulación, así como garantizar la igualdad y no discriminación. El Dr. Risso Ferrand cree que este enfoque es legalmente sólido y evita debates teóricos improductivos.

Además, el desarrollo más positivo reciente en el derecho dentro de Uruguay es el nuevo Manual de Derechos Humanos publicado por el Dr. Mariana Blengio Valdés. En el ámbito del derecho de los derechos humanos en Uruguay, Mariana Blengio Valdés presenta una perspectiva refrescantemente diferente sobre la distinción entre nacionalidad y ciudadanía. Blengio Valdés argumenta que la nacionalidad y la ciudadanía, aunque distintas, son conceptos interconectados influenciados por tradiciones jurídicas históricas y las interpretaciones de académicos como Justino Jiménez de Aréchaga. Señala que la Constitución uruguaya distingue entre nacionalidad, derivada del nacimiento (ius soli) o la sangre (ius sanguinis), y ciudadanía, un estatus legal ligado a derechos y deberes políticos. Las interpretaciones históricas, particularmente las de Aréchaga, enfatizan la nacionalidad como un vínculo natural desde el nacimiento o la sangre, mientras que la ciudadanía es jurídica. Leyes como la Ley Nº 16021 de 1989 y su enmienda de 2015 han extendido la nacionalidad a los descendientes de uruguayos nacidos en el extranjero, pero aún mantienen una distinción entre ciudadanos naturales y legales. La Dra. Blengio Valdés critica el enfoque tradicional, abogando por una comprensión más flexible que acomode las normas internacionales y las realidades prácticas.

La conclusión de la Dra. Blengio Valdés es clara:

"La nacionalidad y la ciudadanía son derechos inherentes que el estado reconoce. Se es nacional y se es ciudadano tanto natural como legal. Lo que determina la distinción en legal y natural es la historia del individuo y como arribó a este vínculo natural con la Nación, que se deriva del «nacimiento, de la sangre o de un acto voluntario» según Jiménez De Aréchaga. Y el acto voluntario es justamente residir, constituir una familia o profesar arte, ciencia o industria, en definitiva, es un acto por el cual la persona se aferra a esa nacionalidad que es la que lo motiva a quedarse en el lugar y participar activamente en la vida política y social, cultural y ambiental."

Ella añade, correctamente, que negar la nacionalidad a los ciudadanos legales y especialmente a aquellos que se encuentran apátridas en Uruguay bajo la convención sobre apatridia por CORE es una negación del derecho fundamental a la identidad.

"La nacionalidad forma parte de la identidad de la persona. Por ende, los derechos de la ciudadanía que se ejercerán por ser nacional, son parte de la identidad de la persona reconocida como derecho inherente por el derecho interno como internacional. La distinción entre nacional y ciudadano podría llegar a la lógica consecuencia de negar la identidad de una persona por una disquisición jurídica que solo se refiere a la forma y no a la esencia."

La mayoría de los académicos, excepto los de niveles más altos en la academia jurídica uruguaya, se niegan a permitir que Uruguay siga siendo internacionalmente avergonzado por argumentos desactualizados, sin fundamento y esencialistas sobre lo que es "evidente" e "implícito" en la Constitución. No creo que la metodología rigurosa de interpretación constitucional uruguaya aplicada al texto de la Constitución respalde la opinión del Dr. Sapolinski y sus coautores. Pero incluso si lo hiciera, otros juristas como el Dr. Risso Ferrand, el Dr. Diego Gamarra y muchos otros, entienden que la Constitución de Uruguay no puede ser interpretada de manera que viole un derecho humano fundamental. Simplemente no puede ser así y no lo será mientras Uruguay siga siendo un estado miembro del Sistema Interamericano. No importa lo que los académicos de derecho constitucional como el Dr. Sapolinski piensen sobre los méritos de esa elección. Ya se ha tomado la decisión y no hay marcha atrás en los derechos humanos.

The Parliamentary Opinion of Dr. Jaime Ruben Sapolinski, Dra. Claudia Arrigo, and Dr. Micaela Prieto regarding Uruguayan Nationality: Argumentum ad Antiquitatem

There are times when we encounter long documents that sound, on first inspection, erudite. Upon reflection and examination based on rigorous methodologies and principles of simple logic and argumentation, however, the veneer of authority can evaporate from seemingly complex documents. We often realize that the complexity was merely a distraction from the lack of substance or support for the claimed positions within.

Such is the case with an opinion provided by Dr. Jaime Ruben Sapolinski, Dra. Claudia Arrigo, and Dr. Micaela Prieto, professors at the law school of the University of the Republic. These three otherwise distinguished law professors submitted their opinion on October 31, 2023, to the Committee on Constitution, Codes, General Legislation, and Administration concerning a draft law titled "Freedom of Movement for Legal Uruguayan Citizens."

Dr. Sapolinski and his colleagues assert a fallacy that it is a Constitutional fact that Uruguayan nationality is acquired solely by birth in the territory. However, their "opinion" is primarily supported by references to traditional interpretations or historical legal opinions without contemporary evidence or reasoning.

The opinion is presented without substantial support or evidence and relies primarily on historical assertions or traditional beliefs. This type of argument is often referred to as an appeal to tradition or argumentum ad antiquitatem. It claims that something is true or correct simply because it has always been believed to be so, without providing concrete evidence or reasoning to support the claim.

This fallacy asserts that something is correct or better because it is older or has always been done that way. It relies on the premise that historical precedent alone is sufficient to justify the truth of the claim. Such an argument does not provide empirical evidence or logical reasoning but instead leans on the idea that "it has always been this way." This type of argument refers to the beliefs or practices of people from the past as somehow consecrating and making real errors in logic and faults in ethnic discrimination simply because they are antique. Sapolinski and his colleagues make this error and seek to confuse the public and legislators by simply suggesting that the long-standing acceptance of an idea is proof of its validity.

Let us take Dr. Sapolinski's attempt at constructing a defense of the current denial of nationality to Uruguayan legal citizens seriously. Dr. Sapolinski and his colleagues posit that the Uruguayan Constitution clearly distinguishes between nationality and citizenship. According to their interpretation, nationality is acquired by birth in the territory, while citizenship is a status that allows participation in civic rights, such as voting and holding public office. The concept of "natural citizenship" refers to individuals born in Uruguay, whereas "legal citizenship" can be acquired by foreigners through residency and registration but does not confer nationality. They argue that the Uruguayan legal framework does not provide for naturalization as a means to acquire nationality. The constitution does not allow for naturalization, thus preventing legal citizens from becoming nationals. Legal citizens, even those who voluntarily acquire citizenship, cannot be considered nationals as the constitutional norms do not support this. They support their arguments with the opinion of distinguished legal scholars such as Justino Jiménez de Aréchaga, who interpreted the Constitution to mean that nationality is strictly acquired by birth in the territory and cannot be obtained through naturalization or legal citizenship. There is, however, no analysis whatsoever of how Jimenez de Arechaga arrived at that conclusion. It is accepted on faith.

Allegedly, such prestigious doctrines within Uruguayan constitutional law consistently maintain the separation between nationality (tied to birth) and legal citizenship (which can be acquired through residency and other conditions).

We know that the Constitution in its text does not speak of nationality except to indicate, through an addition from 1934, that it is not lost by subsequent naturalization. Legal citizenship, according to this addition from that year, is lost by subsequent naturalization. Otherwise, the Constitution speaks only of natural citizens and legal citizens. There is nothing more and nothing less. The opinion submitted to Parliament is mostly smoke and mirrors to cover up this fact.

What facts does the opinion offer to support the assertion that only natural citizens are nationals? Dr. Sapolinski and his coauthors point out that the Uruguayan legal system does not provide a mechanism for naturalization that would allow a foreigner to become a national. This absence, they claim, supports the conclusion that nationality is reserved for those born in the territory.

We may respond that it is obvious the Uruguayan legal system does not currently provide a naturalization mechanism. That is due to the unfounded and unsupported opinion of scholars like Justino Jimenez de Arechaga, not the Constitution itself.

This all boils down to an assertion that certain concepts are "implicitly" enshrined in the Constitution, even though it is, according to the authors, "confusing." Sapolinski and the coauthors use words such as "evident." When Constitutional arguments that should be based on rigorous methodology are reduced to concepts which are implicitly evident and not objectively provable, we should be nervous.

Why does it matter? Dr. Sapolinski gladly excludes legal citizens, who are apparently "naturalized" because they are subject to "subsequent" naturalization, from the nation. Legal citizens are not, he states, within "the protectorate of compatriots that the State grants." Legal citizens, the opinion claims, do not participate in the collective life of the nation, from which the authors expel them.

Dr. Sapolinski is a die-hard defender of this distinction, claiming that "one is national by the fact of being born in the territory. Later, the legislator took some liberty around this issue and expanded the universe beyond what was provided by the Magna Carta." What he means by this is that Law No. 16021, Law No. 18858, and Law No. 19362 granted "nationality" beyond the limits of the Constitution. Children of Uruguayans born abroad and grandchildren should take care that fundamentalists like Dr. Sapolinski and his coauthors do not someday gain control of reversing these laws. If they do, legal citizens will not be the only citizens denied the right to be protected by the State and to participate in the life of the nation.

In short, the opinion is vacuous, illogical, unsupported, and a classic example of argumentum ad antiquitatem. The best strategy when presented with such argumentation is to move on without needing to refute it. Matters of faith, in comparison to matters of acdemic debate, cannot be changed by reason. Perhaps the most we can hope to do is identify this type of argument and separate it from respected future discourse on the topic.

I have argued in a published legal journal article and in other fora that Uruguayan legal citizens (naturalized citizens) should be considered nationals of Uruguay. In doing so, I emphasize the necessity of employing a logical-systematic-teleological method for constitutional interpretation, which involves checking the clarity of the constitutional text, considering the context within the entire constitutional framework, and understanding the teleological (purpose-oriented) intent of the constitutional provisions. I have pointed out that previous interpretations were influenced by outdated notions of ethnicity and race and did not adhere to this rigorous methodology.

One of the most important fallacies set forth by the opinion submitted to Parliament concerns Article 81 of the current Constitution, which states that nationality is not lost by naturalization in another country and differentiates between natural and legal citizens. The convoluted wording of the article has led to misreadings, and the Article can easily be interpreted as granting nationality to both natural and legal citizens. When we examine the historical constitutional provisions, we see that the 1830 Constitution equated citizenship with nationality, the 1918 Constitution reiterated the loss of citizenship by naturalization but provided a path for regaining it, and the 1934 Constitution introduced the distinction between the suspension of citizenship rights and the retention of nationality. Reliance on Justino Jiménez de Aréchaga is misplaced because he set forth no rigorous methodology in his interpretation of nationality and citizenship and instead relied on racial and ethnic essentialism.

But I am not alone in deciding the time is upon us to ignore and work around arguments like the ones supplied by Dr. Sapolinski and his colleagues who signed the opinion. I am not alone because Dr. Sapolinski and the other constitutional scholars completely ignore international human rights law, the American Convention of Human Rights, and the doctrine of conventionality control.

Under the control of conventionality, binding on Uruguay through its solemn state undertaking, the argument presented in the opinion is irrelevant. Dr. Sapolinski and the others present a "heads legal citizens win and tails legal citizens also win" scenario. If the Constitution endorsed discrimination and violation of the fundamental and non-derogable right to nationality, recognized explicitly by the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights, Uruguay would be required to ignore and make inoperative such provisions until the Constitution was modified to conform to international law.

Dr. Martín Risso Ferrand also provided a response to the Comisión de Constitución, Legislación General y Administración de la Cámara de Representantes, addressing the "libertad de circulación de los ciudadanos legales uruguayos" project. He acknowledged the technical imprecisions in the Uruguayan Constitution regarding nationality and citizenship, which have led to various doctrinal theories. Risso Ferrand, however, emphasized that these discussions have become sterile and that the alignment of the Constitution with International Human Rights Law, particularly the American Convention, demands interpretations that favor the broadest protection of rights.

Dr. Sapolinski and his coauthors seem to have written nearly eight pages of text without once mentioning the requirement that the interpretation they are advocating must meet international human rights standards. It is not optional. The complete void in the Sapolinski opinion on this topic is both telling and disturbing.

Dr. Risso Ferrand does much better in aligning Uruguay with international standards. He supported the new proposed law's approach to resolving issues faced by legal Uruguayan citizens abroad, who encounter difficulties using Uruguayan documents. The proposed law would grant legal citizens the same rights and prerogatives as nationals for identification, diplomatic protection, and free circulation, as well as ensuring equality and non-discrimination. Dr. Risso Ferrand believes this approach is legally sound and avoids unproductive theoretical debates.

In addition, the most positive recent development in law within Uruguay is the new Manual of Human Rights published by Dr. Mariana Blengio Valdés. In the realm of Uruguayan human rights law, Dr. Mariana Blengio Valdés presents a refreshingly different perspective on the distinction between nationality and citizenship. Dr. Blengio Valdés argues that nationality and citizenship, while distinct, are interconnected concepts influenced by historical legal traditions and the interpretations of scholars like Justino Jiménez de Aréchaga. She notes that the Uruguayan Constitution distinguishes between nationality, derived from birth (ius soli) or blood (ius sanguinis), and citizenship, a legal status tied to political rights and duties. Historical interpretations, particularly those by Aréchaga, emphasize nationality as a natural bond from birth or blood, while citizenship is juridical. Laws such as the 1989 Law No. 16021 and its 2015 amendment have extended nationality to descendants of Uruguayans born abroad, yet still maintain a distinction between natural and legal citizens. Dr. Blengio Valdés critiques the traditional approach, arguing for a more flexible understanding that accommodates international norms and practical realities.

Dr. Blengio Valdés' conclusion is clear:

"Nationality and citizenship are inherent rights recognized by the state. One is a national and a citizen, both natural and legal. What determines the distinction between legal and natural is the individual's history and how they arrived at this natural bond with the Nation, which is derived from 'birth, blood, or a voluntary act' according to Jiménez De Aréchaga. And the voluntary act is precisely to reside, form a family, or practice art, science, or industry; ultimately, it is an act by which the person clings to that nationality that motivates them to stay in the place and actively participate in political, social, cultural, and environmental life."

She adds, correctly, that denying nationality to legal citizens and especially to those found to be stateless in Uruguay under the statelessness convention by CORE is a denial of the fundamental right to identity.

“Nationality is part of a person's identity. Therefore, the citizenship rights that are exercised by being a national are part of the person's identity, recognized as an inherent right by both internal and international law. The distinction between national and citizen could logically lead to the denial of a person's identity through a legal disquisition that refers only to form and not to essence.”

Most scholars below the most senior levels in the Uruguayan legal academy refuse to allow Uruguay to continue to be embarrassed internationally by outdated, unsupported, essentialist arguments for what is "evident" and "implicit" in the Constitution. I do not believe that rigorous Uruguayan constitutional interpretative methodology applied to the text of the Constitution supports the opinion of Dr. Sapolinski and his coauthors. But even if it did, other legal scholars like Dr. Risso Ferrand, Dr. Diego Gamarra, and many others, understand that the Constitution of Uruguay cannot be interpreted in a way that violates a fundamental human right. It simply cannot be and will not be so long as Uruguay remains a member state in the Inter-American System. It matters not what Constitutional legal scholars like Dr. Sapolinski think about the merits of that choice. It has already been made and there is no going backwards on human rights.

Applying the article "Is the Constitution Unconstitutional? Introductory Study" by Ximena Medellín Urquiaga and José Luis Caballero Ochoa to Uruguayan Nationality Doctrine

This opinion about the Constitution makes Uruguay's Constitution "unconstitutional" as it would require the Uruguayan Constitution to violate the American Convention on Human Rights

The so-called majority opinion in Uruguay that the Constitution implies, through the intent of the framers and by indirect reference to the impossibility of losing nationality, that only natural citizens (and their children or grandchildren) are or can be "nationals" of Uruguay, violates the American Convention on Human Rights. This determination is made explicit through Resolution 2/23 of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and the recent hearing at which Uruguay was summoned before the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights on March 1, 2024. This opinion about the Constitution of Uruguay, currently attributed to Justino Jiménez de Aréchaga in his 1946 text and simply repeated by many since that date, does not pass the conventionality control test and places Uruguay in clear violation of its human rights obligations regarding the nationality of its legal citizens.

If this opinion about the Uruguayan Constitution is correct, which is doubtful according to any reasonable historical and legal review, the Uruguayan Constitution is "unconstitutional" because it violates conventionality control, meaning that the Constitution itself violates an international convention that Uruguay adopted through constitutional means.

This paradox highlights a fundamental conflict where the national Constitution, supposedly the supreme law, is in direct contravention with international human rights norms to which Uruguay is bound. The principle of conventionality control requires that national laws, including constitutional provisions, comply with international obligations, particularly those related to human rights, as articulated in the American Convention on Human Rights. The doctrine, reinforced by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, states that states must ensure that their national laws and constitutional norms do not contravene their international commitments. Therefore, maintaining a constitutional interpretation that excludes certain individuals from nationality contradicts Uruguay's international obligations and requires a profound legal reevaluation to reconcile domestic constitutional law with binding international human rights standards.

The questionable but widely accepted opinion in Uruguay that legal citizens are not nationals, based not on the text of the Constitution but on opinions arising during the anti-immigration movements of the 1930s, violates a fundamental human right. According to the article "Is the Constitution Unconstitutional? Introductory Study" by Medellín Urquiaga and Caballero Ochoa, the role of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACHR) is crucial in evaluating the compatibility of national constitutional norms with international treaties. This opinion contradicts the obligation established in Article 2 of the American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR), which mandates states to adopt legislative measures to ensure the rights and freedoms recognized in the Convention.

The IACHR has determined, in specific cases, that incompatibilities between national constitutional norms and international obligations result in the international responsibility of the state and require the modification of the infringing norm as reparation. Jurisprudence illustrates that international norms have equivalence with national norms, subjecting both to scrutiny for compliance with international obligations without hierarchical distinction.

In cases of absolute incompatibility, where there is an irreconcilable conflict between national constitutional norms and international obligations, the IACHR mandates the modification of the constitutional norm. The article also recognizes the criticism of the democratic legitimacy of international courts overturning national norms, but emphasizes that ratification and compliance with international treaties are sovereign decisions made by democratic states.

Fortunately, Uruguay can assert that there is no absolute incompatibility between its Constitution and the American Convention on Human Rights. An alternative, more academically and internationally accepted opinion about the Uruguayan Constitution is presented by Alberto Pérez Pérez in his work "Legal Citizens Are Not Foreigners." This perspective, based on human rights rather than outdated concepts of natural law, offers Uruguay a viable option to harmonize its Constitution with the American Convention on Human Rights. The dialogue has already begun, as evidenced by the hearing before the IACHR on March 1, 2024, and the comments from the Commission. Uruguay must act, or its constitutional interpretation will become one of the main examples of a Constitution declared unconstitutional and violating international human rights and conventionality control.

Uruguay apparently cannot rely on its courts to properly apply conventionality control to the denial of nationality to legal citizens. A recent opinion on the application of conventionality control to the questionable practice of denying nationality to legal citizens demonstrates the absolute failure of the judiciary in Uruguay to effectively or knowledgeably apply conventionality control. The opinion issued by the Court of Appeals of Montevideo on May 8, 2024, in the case "PRADA GARCIA, JUAN v. NATIONAL DIRECTORATE OF CIVIL IDENTIFICATION" (Judgment No. 120/2024), does not effectively apply the doctrine of conventionality control, particularly regarding the right to nationality. Juan Prada, a Uruguayan citizen born in Cuba, sued the National Directorate of Civil Identification for damages after his passport listed his nationality as Cuban, preventing him from traveling to Germany. Prada argued that as a legal citizen of Uruguay, his nationality should be recognized as Uruguayan. However, the court upheld the lower court's decision, stating that Prada's nationality is Cuban by birth and that his status as a legal citizen of Uruguay does not grant him Uruguayan nationality. The court distinguished between nationality and citizenship, referring to various legal scholars and national laws. Despite Prada's arguments referencing international human rights treaties, the court prioritized national legal interpretations over international obligations, thus failing to align with the principles of conventionality control.

The ruling in "PRADA GARCIA, JUAN v. NATIONAL DIRECTORATE OF CIVIL IDENTIFICATION," issued by Dr. Sylvia Márquez, Dr. Carlos E. Gaona, and Dr. Juan Carlos González, demonstrates a significant failure in applying the doctrine of conventionality control. This doctrine, emphasized by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACHR), mandates that national laws, including constitutional provisions, must comply with the human rights treaties to which the state is a party. The court dismisses the relevance of international human rights treaties in favor of national legal interpretations, which contradicts the principle of conventionality control. By not aligning its interpretation with Article 20 of the ACHR, which guarantees the right to nationality, the court overlooks Uruguay's international commitments. The court's strict distinction between nationality and citizenship, relying solely on national scholars and ignoring broader human rights perspectives, restricts the recognition of legal citizens as nationals. This narrow interpretation disregards the inclusive approach mandated by international human rights norms, which advocate for the right to nationality for all legal residents to prevent statelessness and ensure full recognition of their rights. Additionally, the court does not engage in a dialogic interpretation that considers the entire normative environment, including international obligations. The preference should be to harmonize national laws with international human rights standards rather than rigidly adhering to outdated national doctrines. This lack of judicial caution results in a decision that is not only legally questionable but also violates the fundamental human rights principles recognized by the ACHR. The decision starkly contrasts with the doctrine of conventionality control mandated by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights.

By dismissing the application of international human rights treaties and strictly adhering to a narrow interpretation of national laws, the court's decision fails to protect the fundamental right to nationality for Uruguay's legal citizens. This failure underscores the need for judicial systems to integrate international human rights standards into their legal frameworks to ensure comprehensive protection of individual rights and compliance with international obligations.

If the courts cannot be trusted to correctly apply the American Convention on Human Rights, it falls to the Legislative Branch to ensure that Uruguay complies and adopts an interpretation of its Constitution that does not violate its international obligations. Otherwise, time is running out for a determination that the Uruguayan Constitution is itself unconstitutional due to its direct violation of the fundamental and non-derogable right to nationality, a key provision in all conventionality control reviews.

https://juridica.ibero.mx/index.php/juridi/issue/view/63/80

Nacionalidad / Citizenship: Legal Uruguayan

It is amazing, at times, to witness legal and historical justifications for mistakes and injustices offered by those trained neither in the law nor in history. In fact, those trained in other disciplines sometimes stray into seeking to cloak excuses in both law and history without clearly understanding either.

I am grateful that we, as Uruguayans, are committed to the truth and clearing up these misunderstandings, together, wherever we find them.

I read yesterday about a mistaken justification for the current practice of placing the “nation of birth” of legal citizens in the passport field for “nationality.” This is despite the fact that not all legal citizens have such a nationality from a country of birth and despite the fact that OACI, the organization that standardizes passports, allows “citizenship” to be placed in the nationality field.

Listing the “nationality/citizenship” of Uruguayan legal citizens as “Uruguayan legal citizens” does not require any inquiry into who is and who is not a “national” of Uruguay. The English language controlling standards already indicate the field is for citizenship. I’ll explain more on that topic below as we explore why there might be so many mistakes in Uruguayan practice concerning the issuance of correct passports today.

So why would anyone in Uruguay defend the status quo of issuing passports to legal citizens of Uruguay that violate international standards and deviate from compliance with international human rights claim the DNIC must continue to do so? Let us try to understand in good faith and address the errors embedded in such a view with a willing intent to solve the problem together.

First, the author of the particular letter I referenced indicates, with obvious discomfort, that the current legal interpretation of the regulation granting passports allows the processing of the Uruguayan Passport before obtaining the Civic Credential. The author adds one cannot “exercise citizenship” until a legal citizen has that Civic Credential.

This is a mistake made vital by the omission of several words. It would be correct to say that a legal citizen cannot exercise certain rights of citizenship until obtaining a Civic Credential, but getting a passport is not one of those rights for legal citizens. Legal citizens are citizens the moment they are declared such by the Electoral Court.

Outstanding Uruguayan Constitutional scholars have explained that one becomes a legal citizen through the act of receiving a carta of citizenship. One such scholar makes abundantly clear that Uruguayan legal citizens are “citizens” immediately and must simply wait to “exercise the rights of citizenship,” that is, to vote, and even longer to hold office. But receiving a passport is not such a delayed right of citizenship. It is immediate.

Second, the author of this particular letter defending the current practice of the DNIC admits that “Uruguayan legal citizen” was recorded in the nationality field of all Uruguayan passports issued from the first common passport until “1997”, but claims this practice was somehow more justified in the past and throughout Uruguayan history prior to 1997 because  “the interpretation of the legislation was more rigorous than today, as the passport was issued after processing the Civic Credential and thoroughly checking the voting records from electoral events to ensure that the person had not been removed from the electoral roll.”

Whether accurate or not, and we can briefly point out some of the mistakes later, the claims are irrelevant to the question of whether legal citizen passports are issued correctly. Despite the author’s personal opinion that issuing passports prior to receiving a Civic Credential is somehow wrong, or untrustworthy, the Manual de Documento de Identidad y Pasaporte Electrónico published in 2018, indicates on page 86 that a Civic Credential is not required to obtain a passport within the first three years of citizenship (because it would be impossible to obtain under Uruguayan law). The Civic Credential is necessary for a legal citizen to renew his or her passport (because, by that time, it can be obtained).

Third, the author claims that the change from “Uruguayan legal citizen” to the status of “foreigner” on passports was somehow related to the adoption of the MRZ on passports, that zone at the bottom of the page with letters, numbers, and symbols, allowing the passport to be easily scanned for what is called machine reading. In fact, the author claims that the first Uruguayan passport with the MRZ code was issued in 1998. It was not and that claim is made in mistake. The nationality field on Uruguayan passports was changed in 1994, and Uruguayan legal citizens were labeled as foreigners on those passports issued far in advance of the introduction of the MRZ.

Fourth, the author of this missive indicates that Uruguay implemented the new MRZ requirements in OACI Document 9303 on standardization in “strict compliance” with them. Again, this is clearly mistaken and inaccurate.

What is that not accurate? The author himself tells us why.

“For Legal Citizens, the nationality of the country of origin was recorded” in the nationality field and codes. I repeat the author claims strict compliance with Document 9303 because Uruguay itself decides what nationality its legal citizens are, without consulting these other nations in which they were born to see if it is true, and the just places that assumed nationality on international identification. 

Clearly, the author fails to realize that the nationality field is actually for a “nationality” and that the majority of nations on earth do not grant nationality simply by being born in a nation. This must clearly represent a failure to understand what “nationality” is and the proper role of Uruguay in determining “nationality” on behalf of other nations. To be clear, Uruguay cannot determine for other nations who is and who is not a national of that foreign nation. That is a conceit that I do not believe other nations would appreciate. Uruguay would not appreciate other nations designating who are “Uruguayan nationals” based on laws of descent that do not exist in Uruguay but exist in those other nations.

Fifth, the author includes irrelevant information about the biometric data now embedded in passports and unrelated information on what belongs in each MRZ code field on the passports. The information the author uses to fill space is both true and completely beside the point. It is added almost as if it was placed there simply to confuse those only casually familiar with this subject. When seeking to use the standards to support his point that Uruguayan legal citizens should be listed with such random and unverified foreign nationalities the author makes one odd confession: “It is crucial that our documents clearly reflect the corresponding nationality” of the passport holder. But we have already clearly established that nation of birth has absolutely no bearing, legally, on whether a legal citizen is or ever has been a national of the nation of birth and, in addition, that whether such a person is a national of a nation of birth is far outside the scope of Uruguay’s authority to determine.

Clearly, the DNIC and the Ministry of the Interior will work to correct the dissemination and use of such mistaken information. It is vital that lawyers, especially those trained in comparative and international law, help all of us comply with international law. Civil society and scholars are attempting to correct the historical record, and information on the true history of the Uruguayan passport and the correct dates is available publicly. We can have faith that Uruguay will correct incorrect information based on misinterpretations.

But we also need to ensure that true technical experts are the ones making the decisions. OACI recently issued a document called TAG/TRIP/4 Flimsy No. 02, dated October 12, 2023, which clarified again that Document 9303-3, Section 7.1 notes that it is an error when “MRZ citizenship incorrectly reports the country of birth rather than citizenship.” Further, the recent publication explores the fact that English is the official language of the standards, and the word used in English for what goes in this field is citizenship.

It is helpful to be able to explore the places we all agree and those areas in which we can see clear misunderstandings and misinterpretations. I have faith that everyone in the Uruguayan State wishes to work together to issue internationally acceptable passports for legal citizens that do not contain what are, in effect, random, assumed, and often incorrect “nationalities.” The simple solution already provided to Uruguay is that the field is for “citizenship”.

Today we request immediate and unconditional access to the records of the Dirección Nacional de Identificación Civil (DNIC)

I today sent a request pursuant to Law No. 18.381. Uruguay is committed to transparency and government accountability. In particular, I today requested all prior versions of the manual that instructs all employees on how to process identification and passport requests and, secondarily, all information around the period during which the passport and identification card of Uruguay were changed to indicate for the first time that legal citizens were foreigners. In addition, on suspicion that there have been recent email, internal messaging, paper, and other messaging application communication to, by, with, or from Comisario Mayor (R) Jose Luis Rondan Godoy, all communications mentioning nationality, citizneship, or passports was demanded.

Let’s see what we get. If the Dirección Nacional de Identificación Civil plays games, produces less than what we know they have, or otherwise obstructs the march to justice on nationality, nothing could be better for me in the fight for recognition that legal citizens are and always have been nationals of Uruguay as defined by international law.

The information request is at this link.

Let’s get to it. I’m ready.

Adelante.

Information Request to Corte Electoral of Uruguay

Today, I submitted a demand for all information related to legal citizens held by the Electoral Court. Uruguay has a strong transparency and public information law. Absent extraordinary circumstances, the Electoral Court has twenty business days to respond. The letter is available here.

The letter is addressed to Dr. Wilfredo Penco, President of the Electoral Court of the Oriental Republic of Uruguay. It is a formal request for access to information under Law 18.381, which guarantees public access to information in Uruguay. In the letter, I cite the specific articles of the law that outline the procedures for requesting and obtaining information from public agencies. The letter details the format preferences for information production, requests specific information regarding legal citizenship applications, and emphasizes the obligation of the Electoral Court to organize and provide access to requested information. It also includes in a list format of the requested information and reminds the Electoral Court of the deadline of twenty business days to respond.

Versión en español de la presentación ante la Comisión Interamericana de Derechos Humanos referente al PS 189 - Derecho a la nacionalidad y riesgo de apatridia en la legislación

La solicitud de Somos Todos Uruguayos para una audiencia temática ante la Comisión Interamericana de Derechos Humanos se proporciona aquí completa en español. La solicitud fue concedida y la audiencia se llevará a cabo el 1 de marzo de 2024.

La audiencia concierne al cumplimiento actual de Uruguay con sus compromisos para poner fin a la apatridia y los problemas de derechos humanos relacionados con la nacionalidad. Somos Todos Uruguayos representa los intereses de más de 30,000 ciudadanos legales de Uruguay y aquellos en proceso de obtener la ciudadanía. La solicitud para una audiencia tenía como objetivo abordar los problemas surgidos de la negación arbitraria de la nacionalidad uruguaya a ciudadanos naturalizados, denominados "ciudadanos legales" en Uruguay. Destacamos la necesidad de una discusión sobre las obligaciones internacionales de Uruguay para prevenir y abordar la apatridia, enfatizando la prohibición de la privación arbitraria de la nacionalidad y la discriminación.

A pesar de los avances de Uruguay en derechos humanos y su liderazgo internacional, existe una clara contradicción en su política de negar la nacionalidad a individuos apátridas y revocar la nacionalidad de otros ciudadanos legales. Argumentamos que se necesita urgentemente una discusión temática para explorar las inconsistencias en las leyes de nacionalidad de Uruguay e identificar soluciones viables. Esperamos que el gobierno participe de buena fe y de manera significativa para abordar los problemas identificados en esta solicitud.

Carta de presentación para la Dra. Tania Reneaum Panszi

Presentación para la solicitud de audiencia temática - Cumplimiento por parte del Uruguay con los compromisos para poner fin a la apatridia y a otras cuestiones relacionadas con los derechos humanos concernientes a la nacionalidad 

Desafiando las concepciones tradicionales de nacionalidad: una revisión crítica de las interpretaciones del Dr. Sapolinski y la defensa de un marco legal moderno en Uruguay (versión en Español)

En el ámbito de la erudición jurídica, la precisión y la adhesión a los estándares internacionalmente aceptados no son meros ideales, sino necesidades imperantes. Este ensayo examina críticamente la obra del Dr. Jaime Ruben Sapolinski contenida en su artículo sobre "nacionalidad," publicado en la Revista de Derecho Constitucional, titulado "Nación, Nacionalidad y Estado en el Marco Institucional Uruguayo". El Dr. Sapolinski no aborda de manera notable las dimensiones históricas y de derechos humanos cruciales inherentes al concepto de nacionalidad. En lugar de ofrecer un análisis jurídico riguroso, su enfoque se inclina hacia perspectivas desfasadas, filosóficas y parroquiales que no cumplen con las demandas del moderno derecho internacional y los principios de derechos humanos. Además, no aplica los métodos aceptados de la metodología interpretativa constitucional uruguaya al Artículo 81 de la Constitución.

Esta crítica subraya la imperiosa necesidad de la erudición jurídica, especialmente en un sistema legal como el de Uruguay, que carece de interpretaciones judiciales definitivas, de alinearse con definiciones globalmente reconocidas y principios de derechos humanos. La erudición jurídica debe trascender interpretaciones subjetivas y visiones locales para abrazar una metodología históricamente informada y consciente de los derechos. Al desafiar las diversas definiciones de "nación" y "nacionalidad" del Dr. Sapolinski, esta réplica aboga por una interpretación de estos términos legalmente más robusta e inclusiva, consistente con las normas internacionales y respetuosa de los derechos de todos los ciudadanos, incluyendo a los inmigrantes.

Esta respuesta al Dr. Sapolinski no es meramente una crítica al trabajo de un colega académico, sino un llamado al rigor académico y al compromiso de mantener la integridad de los estándares legales internacionales en la interpretación de disposiciones constitucionales relacionadas con la nacionalidad en Uruguay. Es un empeño por honrar el legado de juristas estimados como Alberto Pérez Pérez, abogando por una erudición jurídica que Puente a la brecha entre interpretaciones nacionales y obligaciones internacionales, asegurando así que nuestra comprensión de la nacionalidad permanezca firmemente arraigada en el contexto más amplio de los derechos humanos y el consenso legal global.

I. Crítica al enfoque interpretativo del Dr. Sapolinski y su desviación del enfoque Pretendido

En su artículo, el Dr. Sapolinski, un distinguido profesor de Derecho Constitucional en la Universidad de la República, lamentablemente pasa por alto tanto la evolución histórica como las significativas implicaciones en derechos humanos de una definición de "nacionalidad" interpretada de manera restrictiva — postura que a menudo adopta un segmento de los académicos jurídicos uruguayos. El artículo del Dr. Sapolinski no necesitaba su análisis incluido sobre varios filósofos de los siglos XVIII y XIX, pero se habría beneficiado de la incorporación de normas legales internacionales.

La esencia del derecho es su capacidad para definir la terminología y los conceptos con precisión, facilitando su aplicación práctica en una sociedad regida por leyes. El deber primordial de los académicos jurídicos, particularmente en un sistema como el de Uruguay, carente de interpretaciones judiciales definitivas, es proporcionar interpretaciones de las leyes y disposiciones constitucionales que reflejen mejor su verdadera intención y alcance. La erudición jurídica excepcional no puede permitirse ser empañada por desviaciones filosóficas, argumentando que los significados son maleables e influenciados por experiencias individuales, antecedentes educativos, ideologías, creencias o intereses personales.

Este principio de una erudición cuidadosa y aceptada internacionalmente adquiere aún mayor significado cuando la labor académica implica descifrar el uso internacional de términos y frases encontrados en el derecho internacional consuetudinario — la ley universalmente reconocida y aplicable — así como en compromisos basados en tratados. Las terminologías legales internacionales poseen significados definidos. Cuando Uruguay ratifica un tratado, ejerciendo sus derechos soberanos como lo sanciona su Constitución, implícitamente respalda los significados internacionales de los términos empleados en el tratado. Si Uruguay disiente de estas interpretaciones aceptadas internacionalmente, retiene la prerrogativa de abstenerse de ratificar el tratado o expresar sus reservas explícitamente.

En su artículo, el Dr. Sapolinski sí articula un marco general para la interpretación constitucional en Uruguay. Plantea que tal interpretación debe inicialmente depender del significado literal del texto. Cuando esta interpretación literal resulta insuficiente, se debe recurrir a la intención explícita de la legislación o a su contexto histórico para obtener claridad. Se prefiere el significado natural y evidente de las palabras, salvo en instancias donde la legislación asigna una definición diferente, en casos que involucran jerga técnica que supera la interpretación aparente, o cuando un término está definido de manera distinta para fines legislativos.

Sin embargo, el artículo notablemente no logra especificar cuáles artículos constitucionales el Dr. Sapolinski pretende interpretar. No aborda el tema central del Seminario Taller, el taller, en el cual se presentó inicialmente el trabajo. Ese taller se organizó para analizar la ciudadanía legal a través del prisma de los derechos. En cambio, el trabajo del Dr. Sapolinski se desvía hacia una exploración de las sutilezas lingüísticas y contextos históricos de términos como "nación" y "nacionalidad", apartándose así de su enfoque previsto.

II. Examinando las múltiples definiciones de "nación" del Dr. Sapolinski y sus implicaciones

Dejando a un lado la omisión del artículo de una discusión sobre los derechos de los ciudadanos legales en Uruguay, y a pesar de que ese era el tema del taller en el que se presentó, es justificado analizar lo que el trabajo del Dr. Sapolinski pretende lograr.

El discurso del Dr. Sapolinski comienza delineando cuatro posibles interpretaciones lingüísticas del término "nación". La primera definición se basa en la etnicidad. Resulta algo sorprendente que el Dr. Sapolinski incluya una definición basada en la etnicidad entre sus definiciones. Esta perspectiva, que atribuye la identidad nacional a elementos estructurales únicos como rasgos físicos, características biológicas, rasgos culturales o incluso vestimenta, parece anacrónica para un análisis legal del siglo XXI. Históricamente, tal definición encontró favor en ciertos círculos europeos durante los siglos XIX y principios del XX, pero desde entonces ha sido ampliamente desacreditada como un concepto viable de nación.

Además, complicando las cosas, la narrativa del Dr. Sapolinski rápidamente se desvía de una discusión sobre los derechos de los ciudadanos legales a una confluencia de "nacionalidad" con la doctrina ideológica del "nacionalismo". Esta confluencia se hace evidente a través de su dependencia de una publicación de 2018 de Iván Romero sobre la historia del nacionalismo. Intrigantemente, el Dr. Sapolinski no rechaza de manera absoluta esta visión etnocéntrica de una nación. Romero explica que el nacionalismo basado en la etnicidad obtiene apoyo del controvertido trabajo de Joseph Arthur, Conde de Gobineau, autor del Ensayo sobre la Desigualdad de las Razas Humanas (1853-1855). En lugar de rechazar o simplemente omitir tal justificación, el Dr. Sapolinski la presenta como una posibilidad teórica para definir "nación", usándola como un trampolín para discutir la concepción de "nación" en Uruguay.

El Dr. Sapolinski argumenta que Uruguay rechaza la nacionalidad étnica, citando su enfoque "inclusivo" sobre lo que es la "nación" porque Uruguay incorpora en la nación a los "descendientes" (al menos aquellos nacidos en Uruguay) de diversos grupos étnicos. Los uruguayos de segunda generación incluyen, por ejemplo, a armenios, afrodescendientes e inmigrantes españoles o italianos. Él llama a tales "descendientes" Orientales. Sin embargo, esta explicación rápidamente cambia de enfoque y pierde persuasión, simplemente introduciendo una nueva categoría étnica, denominada "Oriental", evadiendo así el tema central, y obviamente cierra la oportunidad para que los ciudadanos legales sean Orientales.

La segunda definición proporcionada por el Dr. Sapolinski etiqueta a la "nación" como un concepto antropológico. Sugiere que la identidad nacional se forma a través de elementos culturales compartidos como el idioma, las tradiciones históricas, las costumbres, los símbolos y los relatos míticos. Esta perspectiva recibe apoyo, según el Dr. Sapolinski, del pensador del siglo XIX Ernest Renan, quien ha sido objeto de considerable crítica en la época moderna por sus vistas deterministas sobre las características raciales y sus opiniones polémicas sobre la "raza" semítica. Las concepciones antropológicas de la nación generalmente son benignas, pero no permiten la incorporación de múltiples tradiciones en una nación.

Mientras el Dr. Sapolinski hace referencia a la definición más inclusiva de Renan de una nación como un colectivo que aspira a vivir y lograr juntos, esta interpretación queda eclipsada por el legado controvertido de Renan. El trabajo de Renan no se alinea limpiamente con las comprensiones contemporáneas de la identidad nacional en el derecho internacional moderno y los derechos humanos.

La tercera definición del Dr. Sapolinski equipara "nación" con "estado", como ejemplifica la Constitución Argentina, nos dice. Sin embargo, el Dr. Sapolinski no reconoce que esta visión se alinea con la definición legal internacional ampliamente aceptada de "nación" y "estado". Simplemente menciona, de manera incidental, que Argentina usa esta definición. Aquí encontramos la verdadera definición de nación, pero se le proporciona solo unas pocas frases en el artículo.

Por último, el Dr. Sapolinski propone una definición de nación como una entidad o concepto que encarna la soberanía, como se refleja en la Constitución de Uruguay de 1830. Esta definición lleva a una digresión histórica, tocando el trabajo de la Asamblea Nacional Francesa en 1789 y el debate sobre la soberanía durante el golpe de Gabriel Terra, que, aunque informativo, se desvía del tema central de los derechos de los ciudadanos legales y la definición internacionalmente reconocida de "nacional".

III. La desviación del Dr. Sapolinski al no abordar las definiciones legales internacionales de “nacional” y las implicaciones no exploradas de sus cuatro definiciones de “nación”

A pesar de que el tema central del artículo sea los derechos de los ciudadanos legales en Uruguay, la discusión del Dr. Sapolinski se desvía significativamente, fallando en abordar la definición legal internacional de 'nacional' o los derechos de cualquier ciudadano. El Dr. Sapolinski parece utilizar este rodeo para sentar las bases para afirmar la falta de una definición uniforme de "nación" en el derecho internacional. Sin embargo, en lugar de abordar este problema fundamental directamente, introduce cuatro interpretaciones novedosas de "nación", dejando sin explorar su relevancia para la definición de "nacionalidad" en el derecho internacional y nacional.

Consideremos estos resúmenes de definiciones proporcionadas para "nación" por el Dr. Sapolinski:

1. El Dr. Sapolinski sugiere que podríamos ver al estado como la nación, pero describe al "estado" principalmente como un mecanismo administrativo para una nación. Sugiere que los estados, si se consideran naciones, podrían luchar para fomentar un sentido de "singularidad cultural" que engendra la identidad nacional. El Dr. Sapolinski claramente duda que un estado pueda cohesionarse suficientemente para formar una nación. Su duda parece fuera de lugar. Su visión de que los "estados" no pueden ser naciones con un sentido de nacionalismo parece pasar por alto ejemplos como los Estados Unidos, donde se evidencia un fuerte sentido de identidad nacional.

2. El Dr. Sapolinski luego revisa una definición de "nación" basada en la etnicidad, citando "características comunes" de apariencia, pero no logra distanciar este concepto de sus controvertidas asociaciones históricas con la eugenesia y las ideologías fascistas.

3. En su tercera definición, el Dr. Sapolinski sorprendentemente usa "nacionalidad" para definir "nación", pero lo hace de manera circular. Declara que la nacionalidad es "lugar de nacimiento" y luego usa esa definición como base de nación. Esta interpretación simplista basada en el lugar de nacimiento carece de sustento y no se alinea con las complejas realidades de las normas internacionales y los derechos de ciudadanía.

4. Por último, define "nación" basándose en el nacionalismo, un concepto a menudo entrelazado con ideologías y supremacía. Sin embargo, el artículo no se involucra críticamente con los aspectos problemáticos del nacionalismo, en su lugar lo retrata como un fenómeno social unificador. La mayoría de los eruditos modernos no creen que el nacionalismo, una expresión de supremacía nacional basada en ideología o características, sea una fuerza positiva en el entorno político actual y esperaría que el Dr. Sapolinski estuviera de acuerdo con ese consenso.

La siguiente sección del artículo es bastante peculiar. En un seminario supuestamente sobre nacionalidad y los derechos de los ciudadanos, el Dr. Sapolinski opta por no explorar la definición de nacional. En cambio, el Dr. Sapolinski encuentra cada ocurrencia de la palabra "nación" y sitúa su uso en contexto. Esta parte de la exposición es adecuada para lo que intenta, pero no tiene ninguna relevancia para el concepto de quién es un "nacional" de Uruguay. De hecho, todos los nacionales de Uruguay son miembros de la "nación", y, a menos que el uso de la palabra "nación" de alguna manera indique quién es un nacional, el uso de la palabra nación por sí sola es irrelevante. Dejando de lado la preocupación sobre si el uso de la palabra "nación" en la Constitución es significativo, podemos reformular la conclusión del Dr. Sapolinski. En general, concluye que la Constitución uruguaya actual usa la palabra nación para significar tres conceptos separados. Esos tres conceptos para nación son, primero, el titular de la soberanía, segundo, una comunidad organizada y tercero, el propio estado.

IV. La interpretación del Dr. Sapolinski de la constitución y la cuestionable afirmación con respecto al artículo 74

Con la sección que meticulosamente rastrea el uso de la palabra "nación" en la Constitución ya analizada, el artículo finalmente llega a un análisis muy breve del uso de la palabra "nacional" en la Constitución. Gran parte del texto es innecesario, ya que observa el uso de la palabra como adjetivo, como en "tesorería nacional". Tal vez este uso adjetival sea interesante, pero es irrelevante para determinar quién es nacional en Uruguay.

Hay un tratamiento muy breve del uso de la palabra nacional en lo que se refiere a individuos. Yo llamaría esto el "corazón" del trabajo. Si es el argumento central, se refiere a una afirmación asombrosa sobre el Artículo 74 de la Constitución. El Dr. Sapolinski afirma que la "nacionalidad" se encuentra en el Artículo 74 de la actual Constitución Uruguaya:

En el artículo 74, cuando se menciona la calidad de padre o madre orientales como requisito para el otorgamiento de la ciudadanía natural a sus hijos, cualquiera haya sido el lugar de nacimiento, condicionado al hecho de que se avecinen en el país y se inscriban en el Registro Cívico.

El Artículo 74 no dice tal cosa. No tiene nada que ver con el concepto de nacionalidad. No utiliza la palabra nacional. De hecho, el único concepto que menciona es la ciudadanía natural. Aquí está el Artículo 74.

Artículo 74. Ciudadanos naturales son todos los hombres y mujeres nacidos en cualquier punto del territorio de la República. Son también ciudadanos naturales los hijos de padre o madre orientales, cualquiera haya sido el lugar de su nacimiento, por el hecho de avecinarse en el país e inscribirse en el Registro Cívico.

El Artículo 81 de la actual Constitución sí utiliza la palabra "nacionalidad". El Artículo 81 establece que un ciudadano natural no pierde la nacionalidad si se naturaliza en otra nación. El Dr. Sapolinski menciona esto, de pasada. Mientras que el Artículo 81, en mi argumento, no significa que los ciudadanos legales no sean nacionales, es probablemente la única cláusula en la Constitución que debería haber sido objeto de discusión en todo el artículo. Merece ser interpretada si supuestamente es la base para negar la nacionalidad a los ciudadanos legales. Pero no encontramos nada sobre el tema en el artículo.

V. Criticando las afirmaciones del Dr. Sapolinski y promoviendo una interpretación más inclusiva de la nacionalidad y la ciudadanía

Las dos últimas páginas del artículo del Dr. Sapolinski nos brindan sus opiniones personales sobre la nacionalidad y la ciudadanía, con una sola cita a la opinión de 1946 de Justino Jiménez de Aréchaga. El Dr. Sapolinski se siente libre de inyectar opiniones extralegales y no textuales, aparentemente, sin referenciar significados históricos, porque “la regulación constitucional de la nacionalidad y la ciudadanía es confusa”. Luego afirma, “Un par de conceptos, aunque no expresados claramente, están explícita o implícitamente consagrados en la Constitución”.

Aquí están los conceptos “explícitos” o "implícitos" que el Dr. Sapolinski cree están consagrados en la Constitución:

1. La Constitución Uruguaya tiene un concepto de quién es un "nacional".

2. Encontramos la mera afirmación del Dr. Sapolinski de que "el significado natural y obvio de 'nacional' se refiere a una persona nacida en el territorio".

3. El ejercicio de "derechos ciudadanos", tanto naturales como legales, está condicionado a establecerse en el territorio y cumplir con el requisito de registro en el Registro Cívico Nacional.

4. Nacional y ciudadano natural no son sinónimos en Uruguay, sino "situaciones diferentes a las que se accede cumpliendo requisitos idénticos".

5. Basándose solo en Justino Jiménez de Aréchaga, el Dr. Sapolinski concluye, "la calidad de nacional depende, por lo tanto, de un hecho, el nacimiento dentro del territorio del Estado". Basándose en esta débil base, se siente cómodo al afirmar que, "La adquisición de la ciudadanía legal no confiere la nacionalidad Oriental", aunque el ciudadano legal participe en el ejercicio de la soberanía, y esta exista "radicalmente en la Nación".

Mi escepticismo persiste. Cualquier académico jurídico comprometido con la meticulosa aplicación de los métodos interpretativos constitucionales uruguayos debería compartir este escepticismo. Los argumentos del Dr. Sapolinski no logran abordar, y mucho menos refutar, la definición internacional de “nacionalidad” y su aplicación en tratados. Cuando se basan únicamente en la opinión subjetiva, las visiones parroquiales de académicos uruguayos individuales no logran tener poder persuasivo en un contexto global.

Esta línea de razonamiento defectuosa lleva a una conclusión absurda y tautológica. El Dr. Sapolinski, utilizando estos débiles argumentos, parece decidido a excluir a los ciudadanos legales, particularmente a los inmigrantes, del concepto de nacionalidad uruguaya. Tal exclusión no solo los saca del abrazo protector de la nación, sino que también les niega un papel en la configuración del futuro colectivo de Uruguay y en la participación en su vida cívica. Justifica esta exclusión afirmando que representa “la práctica habitual entre los países”, una afirmación que carece de fundamento y parece más una afirmación de creencia personal que un reflejo de normas o prácticas legales reales.

El Dr. Sapolinski lo expresa así:

La nacionalidad es considerada como un manto protector a los compatriotas que corresponde al Estado. ¿Cuál es la fuente de ello? La práctica habitual entre los países. Como punto de conexión la nacionalidad se erige en un marco para la participación en el destino colectivo y por eso se le reconoce el derecho de participar, en calidad de ciudadano, de la vida cívica de su país. El concepto de ciudadanía, por su parte, apunta al ejercicio de los derechos y deberes cívicos.

Sus palabras, "la práctica habitual entre los países", quedan sin el respaldo de un análisis legal comparativo o jurisprudencia internacional. Esta retórica, aparentemente arraigada en una interpretación estrecha de la nacionalidad, no se involucra con las definiciones más amplias e inclusivas reconocidas en el derecho internacional. Omite la naturaleza dinámica y evolutiva de la nacionalidad como un concepto que debería abarcar a todos los ciudadanos legales, independientemente de su origen, en el viaje compartido del progreso y enriquecimiento cultural de una nación.

El enfoque del Dr. Sapolinski plantea serias preguntas sobre la inclusividad y equidad de su marco interpretativo. Resalta una preocupante tendencia a apoyarse en puntos de vista subjetivos y potencialmente anticuados, lo que corre el riesgo de marginar segmentos significativos de la población de Uruguay y contradice el espíritu inclusivo de los estándares legales internacionales modernos. Creo que también contradice el espíritu inclusivo y la interpretación auténtica de las Constituciones de Uruguay.

Sin embargo, el Dr. Sapolinski afirma que los ciudadanos legales, extranjeros que han buscado voluntariamente la ciudadanía, deberían ser negados de protección diplomática en el extranjero. Aboga por esta exclusión definiendo "nacional" como un estado vinculado exclusivamente a la protección internacional, perpetuando así una postura discriminatoria sin un respaldo sustancial.

Esta interpretación, no solo carente de respaldo evidencial sino también de citas autoritativas, parece estar arraigada en una serie de puntos de vista anticuados y sesgados. La posición final del Dr. Sapolinski es que el estado de ser extranjero es un "hecho objetivo" que permanece inalterado, independientemente de la ciudadanía legal. Esta afirmación contrasta marcadamente con las visiones de la comunidad legal internacional más amplia, donde tal noción está lejos de considerarse "obvia". El derecho internacional a menudo adopta una postura contraria, enfatizando el respeto a los derechos humanos y la inclusividad en la definición de nacionalidad.

VI. El derecho internacional y sus definiciones de estado, nación y nacional

Examinemos lo que el derecho internacional establece con respecto al estado, la nación y el nacional. Podemos hacerlo con citas. En el derecho internacional, un estado, también llamado nación, comprende cuatro elementos esenciales: un territorio definido, una población permanente, un gobierno y una capacidad para llevar a cabo relaciones internacionales.[1] Un estado soberano puede administrar libremente su población en su territorio y establecer su política exterior. En un texto del siglo XVIII, Emer de Vattel definió a las naciones o estados como "cuerpos políticos, sociedades de hombres que se han unido y combinado sus fuerzas, para procurar su bienestar mutuo y sociedad". Agregó: "Toda nación que se gobierna a sí misma, bajo cualquier forma, y que no depende de ninguna otra nación, es un estado soberano".[2]

El estado uruguayo, del cual los ciudadanos legales son parte de la soberanía, es considerado, en el derecho internacional y los tratados, como la nación de Uruguay. Las definiciones internas, domésticas o municipales son irrelevantes para las obligaciones de estado a estado, como las de los tratados sobre apatridia.

La nacionalidad tiene un significado claro en el derecho internacional que atraviesa todas las explicaciones elaboradas en el artículo del Dr. Sapolinski. "La nacionalidad define la relación legal o 'vínculo legal' entre el ciudadano/nacional y su estado". Además, "esta relación se basa en hechos sociales de apego y da lugar a derechos y deberes por parte de ambos lados de esa relación".[3] La Corte Internacional de Justicia (CIJ) en el caso Nottebohm indicó que "La nacionalidad es un vínculo legal que tiene como base un hecho social de apego, una conexión genuina de existencia, interés y sentimientos, junto con la existencia de derechos y deberes recíprocos".[4] De esto se desprende que la nacionalidad se determina por los lazos sociales de una persona con una nación, también llamada estado. Una vez establecidos, esos lazos dan lugar a derechos y deberes por parte del estado, así como por parte del nacional, quien también, en el derecho internacional, se llama ciudadano.

No encontramos mención del lugar de nacimiento en estos materiales internacionales. Las definiciones étnicas anticuadas han sido dejadas de lado. Lo que es considerado "obvio" para el Dr. Sapolinski ni siquiera merece mención en las decisiones y textos internacionales modernos.

Contradiciendo aún más la afirmación del Dr. Sapolinski está el estimado jurista uruguayo Alberto Pérez Pérez, cuyas contribuciones a la erudición legal y la defensa de los derechos humanos presentan una perspectiva más ilustrada y humana. Pérez Pérez, un respetado abogado, activista de derechos humanos y exdecano de la Facultad de Derecho de la Universidad de la República, se desempeñó como juez en la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos. Sus opiniones e interpretaciones legales contrastan marcadamente con las opiniones más limitadas del Dr. Sapolinski.

El Dr. Pérez Pérez elaboró su creencia de que la Constitución de Uruguay no indicaba que los ciudadanos legales fueran extranjeros en 1995. De hecho, el título de su artículo es Los Ciudadanos Legales no son Extranjeros. Aquí hay un extracto:

Como se expuso al principio a nuestro juicio los conceptos de nacionalidad y ciudadanía son idénticos (o coinciden plenamente), al menos en un Estado democrático como la República Oriental del Uruguay. En consecuencia, todos los ciudadanos (es decir, tanto los legales como los naturales) forman, en conjunto, una categoría que se opone a la de extranjeros.[5]

Para un examen exhaustivo de la Constitución Uruguaya, sus disposiciones sobre la nacionalidad y las prácticas e comunicaciones históricas de Uruguay que desafían los puntos de vista del Dr. Sapolinski, remito a los lectores a mi reciente publicación, “La Interpretación Constitucional de la Nacionalidad Uruguaya Según la Metodología Constitucional Uruguaya”, publicada en el volumen 29 del ILSA Journal of International and Comparative Law, página 443, en 2023. Ese artículo incluye muchas visiones alternativas que permiten interpretaciones razonables de la Constitución.

En conclusión, abogo firmemente por un enfoque basado en el rigor académico en lugar de la opinión subjetiva. Me alineo con los estándares ejemplares establecidos por Alberto Pérez Pérez, cuya erudición representa el pináculo de la investigación legal sobre la nacionalidad y la ciudadanía en Uruguay. Estoy de acuerdo con las definiciones internacionales directas de nación y nacional. Este enfoque rechaza las afirmaciones simplistas sobre lo que es “obvio” y “objetivo”, favoreciendo un análisis minucioso y matizado basado en la ley y la historia.

Descargar una versión en PDF

[1] Véase la Convención sobre Derechos y Deberes de los Estados, art. 1, 49 Stat. W. Janis 3097, T.S. No. 881, 3 Bevans 145, 165 L.N.T.S. 19 (realizada en Montevideo el 26 de diciembre de 1933; entró en vigor el 26 de diciembre de 1934).

[2] E, de Vattel, The Law of Nations 3-4, 11 (1758 ed. Fenwick trans. 1919).

[3] Edwards, A. (2014). The meaning of nationality in international law in an era of human rights. In A. Edwards & L. van Waas (Eds.), Nationality and Statelessness under International Law. Cambridge University Press.

[4] Caso Nottebohm (Liechtenstein v. Guatemala); Segunda Fase, Corte Internacional de Justicia (CIJ), 6 de abril de 1955, Informes de la CIJ 1955, p. 4; Lista General, No. 18.

[5] Pérez Pérez, Alberto. "Los ciudadanos legales no son extranjeros." LJU Tomo 111, 297. Cita Online: UY/DOC/765/2009.

Challenging Traditional Notions of Nationality: A Critical Review of Dr. Sapolinski's Interpretations and Advocating for a Modern Legal Framework in Uruguay

In the realm of legal scholarship, precision, and adherence to internationally accepted standards are not merely ideals but necessities. This essay critically examines the work of Dr. Jaime Ruben Sapolinski contained in his article on "nationality," published in the Revista de Derecho Constitucional, entitled Nación, Nacionalidad y Estado en el Marco Institucional Uruguayo. Dr. Sapolinski notably fails to engage with the crucial historical and human rights dimensions inherent to the concept of nationality. Instead of offering a rigorous legal analysis, his approach veers towards outdated, philosophical, and parochial perspectives that fall short of the demands of modern international law and human rights principles. He also fails to apply accepted methods of Uruguayan constitutional interpretative methodology to Article 81 of the Constitution.

This critique underscores the imperative need for legal scholarship, especially in a legal system like Uruguay's, which lacks definitive judicial interpretations, to align with globally recognized definitions and human rights principles. Legal scholarship must transcend subjective interpretations and local views to embrace a historically informed and rights-conscious methodology. In challenging Dr. Sapolinski's various definitions of "nation" and "nationality," this reply advocates for a more legally robust and inclusive interpretation of these terms, consistent with international norms and respectful of the rights of all citizens, including immigrants.

This response to Dr. Sapolinski is not merely a critique of a fellow scholar's work but a call for academic rigor and a commitment to uphold the integrity of international legal standards in interpreting constitutional provisions related to nationality in Uruguay. It is a pursuit to honor the legacy of esteemed jurists like Alberto Pérez Pérez, advocating for a legal scholarship that bridges the gap between national interpretations and international obligations, thereby ensuring that our understanding of nationality remains firmly rooted in the broader context of human rights and global legal consensus.

I. Critique of Dr. Sapolinski's Interpretive Approach and Its Deviation from the Intended Focus 

In his article, Dr. Sapolinski, a distinguished professor of Constitutional Law at the University of the Republic, regrettably overlooks both the historical evolution and the significant human rights implications of a narrowly construed definition of “nationality” — a stance often adopted by a segment of Uruguayan legal scholars. Dr. Sapolinski’s article did not need its included analysis of various eighteenth and nineteenth-century philosophers, but it would have benefitted from an incorporation of international legal norms.

The essence of law is its capacity to define terminology and concepts with precision, facilitating their practical application within a society governed by laws. The paramount duty of legal scholars, particularly in a system such as Uruguay's, bereft of definitive judicial interpretations, is to furnish interpretations of laws and constitutional provisions that best reflect their true intent and scope. Exceptional legal scholarship cannot afford to be marred by philosophical diversions, arguing that meanings are malleable and influenced by individual experiences, educational backgrounds, ideologies, beliefs, or vested interests.

This principle of careful and internationally-accepted scholarship gains even greater significance when the scholarly endeavor involves deciphering the international usage of terms and phrases found in customary international law — the law universally acknowledged and applicable — as well as in treaty-based commitments. International legal terminologies possess defined meanings. When Uruguay ratifies a treaty, exerting its sovereign rights as sanctioned by its Constitution, it implicitly endorses the international meanings of terms employed in the treaty. Should Uruguay dissent from these internationally accepted interpretations, it retains the prerogative to either abstain from ratifying the treaty or express its reservations explicitly.

In his article, Dr. Sapolinski does articulate a general framework for constitutional interpretation in Uruguay. He posits that such interpretation should initially hinge on the text's literal meaning. Where this literal interpretation proves inadequate, one must then turn to the explicit intent of the legislation or its historical context for clarity. The natural and apparent meaning of words is preferred, barring instances where the legislation assigns a different definition, in cases involving technical jargon superseding the apparent interpretation, or when a term is distinctly defined for legislative purposes.

Yet, the article notably falls short of specifying which constitutional articles Dr. Sapolinski purports to interpret. It fails to address the central theme of the Taller Seminar, the workshop, in which the paper was first presented. That workshop was organized to analyze legal citizenship through the lens of rights. Instead, Dr. Sapolinski’s paper deviates into an exploration of the linguistic nuances and historical contexts of terms like “nation” and “nationality,” thus straying from its intended focus.

II. Examining Dr. Sapolinski's Multiple Definitions of "Nation" and Their Implications 

Setting aside the paper's omission of a discussion on the rights of legal citizens in Uruguay, and despite the fact that was the topic of the workshop in which it was delivered, an analysis of what Dr. Sapolinski's work purports to achieve is warranted.

Dr. Sapolinski's discourse begins by outlining four potential linguistic interpretations of the term “nation.” The first definition is based on ethnicity. It is somewhat surprising that Dr. Sapolinski includes an ethnicity-based definition among his definitions. This perspective, which attributes nationhood to unique structural elements like physical traits, biological characteristics, cultural features, or even clothing, seems anachronistic for a twenty-first-century legal analysis. Historically, such a definition found favor in certain European circles during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, but it has since been widely discredited as a viable concept of nationhood.

Further complicating matters, Dr. Sapolinski's narrative swiftly diverges from a discussion of the rights of legal citizens to a conflation of “nationality” with the ideological doctrine of “nationalism.” This conflation becomes evident through his reliance on a 2018 publication by Iván Romero on the history of nationalism. Intriguingly, Dr. Sapolinski does not outright reject this ethnic-centric view of a nation. Romero explains that ethnic-based nationalism draws support from the controversial work of Joseph Arthur, Comte de Gobineau, author of Essay on the Inequality of the Human Races (1853-1855). Instead of rejecting or just omitting such a justification, Dr. Sapolinski presents it as a theoretical possibility for defining “nation,” using it as a steppingstone to discuss Uruguay's conception of “nation.”

Dr. Sapolinski argues that Uruguay rejects ethnic nationality, citing its “inclusive” approach to what is the “nation” because Uruguay incorporates into the nation the “offspring” (at least those born in Uruguay) of diverse ethnic groups. Second generation Uruguayans include, for example,  Armenians, Afro-Descendants, and Spanish or Italian immigrants. He calls such “offspring” Orientals. However, this explanation quickly shifts focus and loses persuasiveness, simply introducing a new ethnic category, termed “Oriental,” thus bypassing the core issue, and obviously forecloses the opportunity for legal citizens to be Oriental.

The second definition provided by Dr. Sapolinski labels “nation” as an anthropological concept. He suggests that nationhood is formed through shared cultural elements like language, historical traditions, customs, symbols, and mythical narratives. This perspective draws support, according to Dr. Sapolinski, from the nineteenth-century thinker Ernest Renan, who has been subject to considerable critique in modern times for his deterministic views on racial characteristics and his contentious opinions on the Semitic “race.” Anthropological conceptions of nation are generally benign, but they fail to allow for multiple traditions to be incorporated into one nation.

While Dr. Sapolinski references Renan's more inclusive definition of a nation as a collective that aspires to live and achieve together, this interpretation is overshadowed by Renan's controversial legacy. Renan’s work does not align neatly with contemporary understandings of nationhood in modern international law and human rights.

Dr. Sapolinski's third definition equates “nation” with “state,” as the Argentine Constitution exemplifies, he tells us. However, Dr. Sapolinski neglects to acknowledge that this view aligns with the widely accepted international legal definition of “nation” and “state.” He simply mentions, in an offhand way, that Argentina uses this definition. Here we find the true definition of nation, but it is provided only a few sentences in the article.

Lastly, Dr. Sapolinski proposes a definition of a nation as an entity or concept embodying sovereignty, as reflected in Uruguay's 1830 Constitution. This definition leads to a historical digression, touching upon the French National Assembly's work in 1789 and the debate over sovereignty during Gabriel Terra's coup, which, while informative, strays from the central topic of the rights of legal citizens and the internationally recognized definition of “national.”

III. Dr. Sapolinski's Divergence from Addressing International Legal Definitions of 'National' and the Unexplored Implications of His Four 'Nation' Definitions

Despite the article's central theme being the rights of legal citizens in Uruguay, Dr. Sapolinski's discussion strays significantly, failing to address the international legal definition of 'national' or the rights of any citizens. Dr. Sapolinski appears to use this detour to lay the groundwork for asserting the lack of a uniform definition of “nation” in international law. However, instead of addressing this fundamental issue directly, he introduces four novel interpretations of “nation,” leaving their relevance to the definition of “nationality” in international and domestic law unexplored.

Let's consider these summaries of definitions provided for “nation” by Dr. Sapolinski:

1. Dr. Sapolinski suggests that we might see the state as the nation, but he describes the “state” as primarily an administrative mechanism for a nation. He suggests that states, if considered nations, might struggle to foster a sense of “cultural uniqueness” that engenders national identity. Dr. Sapolinski clearly doubts that a state can sufficiently cohere to form a nation. His doubt seems misplaced. His view that “states” cannot be nations with a sense of nationalism seemingly overlooks examples like the United States, where a strong sense of national identity is evident.

2. Dr. Sapolinski next revisits an ethnically based definition of “nation,” citing “common characteristics” of appearance, yet he fails to distance this concept from its controversial historical associations with eugenics and fascist ideologies.

3. In his third definition, Dr. Sapolinski surprisingly uses “nationality” to define “nation,” but does so in a circular manner. He declares that nationality is “place of birth” and then uses that definition as the basis of nation. This simplistic interpretation based on place of birth lacks substantiation and fails to align with the complex realities of international norms and citizenship rights.

4. Lastly, he defines “nation” based on nationalism, a concept often intertwined with ideologies and supremacy. However, the article does not critically engage with the problematic aspects of nationalism, instead portraying it as a unifying social phenomenon. Most modern scholars do not believe that nationalism, an expression of national supremacy based on ideology or characteristics, is a positive force in the current political environment and I would expect Dr. Sapolinski to agree with that consensus.

The next section of the article is rather peculiar. In a seminar allegedly concerning nationality and the rights of citizens, Dr. Sapolinski opts not to explore the definition of national. Instead, Dr. Sapolinski finds each occurrence of the word “nation” and places its use in context. This part of the exposition is adequate for what it attempts, but it has no bearing on the concept of who is a “national” of Uruguay. Indeed, all nationals of Uruguay are members of the “nation,” and, unless the use of the word “nation” somehow indicates who is a national, the use of the word nation by itself is beside the point. Putting the concern about whether the use of the word “nation” in the Constitution is meaningful, we can restate Dr. Sapolinski’s conclusion. Overall, he concludes that the current Uruguayan Constitution uses the word nation to signify three separate concepts. Those three concepts for nation are, first, the holder of sovereignty, second, an organized community, and third, the state itself.

IV. Dr. Sapolinski's Interpretation of the Constitution and the Questionable Assertion Regarding Article 74

With the section meticulously tracing the use of the word “nation” in the Constitution behind us, the article finally arrives at a very short analysis of the use of the word “national” in the Constitution. Most of the text is unnecessary, because it looks at the use of the word as an adjective, as in “national treasury.” Perhaps this adjectival use is interesting, but it is irrelevant to who in Uruguay is a national.

There is a very short treatment of the use of the word national as it applies to individuals. I would call this the “heart” of the paper. If it is the core argument, it concerns an astounding claim about Article 74 of the Constitution. Dr. Sapolinski states “nationality” is found in Article 74 of the current Uruguayan Constitution:

In Article 74, when mentioning the status of Oriental father or mother as a requirement for granting natural citizenship to their children, regardless of the place of birth, conditioned upon settling in the country and registering in the Civic Registry.

Article 74 says no such thing. It has nothing to do with the concept of nationality. It does not use the word national. In fact, the only concept it mentions is natural citizenship. Here is Article 74.

Article 74. All men and women born at any place within the territory of the Republic are natural citizens. Children of Uruguayan fathers or mothers are also natural citizens, wherever they may have been born, provided that they take up residence in the country and register themselves in the Civil Register.

Article 81 of the current Constitution does, in contrast, use the word “nationality.” Article 81 states that nationality is not lost by a natural citizen if they naturalize in another nation. Dr. Sapolinski does mention this, in passing. While Article 81, in my argument, does not mean legal citizens are not nationals, it is likely the only clause in the Constitution that should have been subject to discussion in the entire article. It is worthy of being interpreted if it is allegedly the basis for denying nationality to legal citizens. But we find nothing on the topic in the article.

V. Critiquing Dr. Sapolinski's Assertions and Promoting a More Inclusive Interpretation of Nationality and Citizenship

The final two pages of Dr. Sapolinski’s article provide us with his personal opinions on nationality and citizenship, with a citation only to the 1946 opinion of Justino Jiménez de Aréchaga. Dr. Sapolinski feels free to inject extralegal and non-textual opinions, apparently, without referencing historical meanings, because “the constitutional regulation of nationality and citizenship is confusing.” He then states, “A couple of concepts, though not clearly expressed, are expressly or implicitly enshrined in the Constitution.”

Here are the “express” or "implicit" concepts Dr. Sapolinski believes are enshrined in the Constitution:

1. The Uruguayan Constitution has a concept of who is a "national."

2. We find the bare assertion by Dr. Sapolinski that "the natural and obvious meaning of 'national' refers to a person born in the territory."

3. The exercise of "citizen rights," both natural and legal, is conditioned on settling in the territory and fulfilling the registration requirement in the National Civic Registry.

4. National and natural citizen are not synonyms in Uruguay but are "different situations accessed by fulfilling identical requirements."

5. Based only on Justino Jiménez de Aréchaga, Dr. Sapolinski concludes, "the quality of national depends, therefore, on a fact, birth within the territory of the State." Based on this flimsy reed, he is comfortable to state that, "The acquisition of legal citizenship does not confer Oriental nationality," even though the legal citizen participates in the exercise of sovereignty, and this exists "radically in the Nation."

My skepticism persists. Any legal scholar committed to the meticulous application of Uruguayan constitutional interpretive methods should share this skepticism. Dr. Sapolinski's arguments fall short of addressing, let alone refuting, the international definition of “nationality” and its application in treaties. When grounded solely in subjective opinion, the parochial views of individual Uruguayan academicians fail to hold persuasive power in a global context.

This flawed line of reasoning leads to a nonsensical and tautological conclusion. Dr. Sapolinski, utilizing these weak arguments, appears intent on excluding legal citizens, particularly immigrants, from the concept of Uruguayan nationality. Such exclusion not only removes them from the protective embrace of the nation but also denies them a role in shaping Uruguay's collective future and participating in its civic life. He justifies this exclusion by stating it represents “the usual practice among countries,” a claim that lacks substantiation and seems more an assertion of personal belief than a reflection of actual legal norms or practices.

Dr. Sapolinski puts it like this:

Nationality is considered a protective mantle for compatriots, corresponding to the state. The source of this is the usual practice among countries. As a point of connection, nationality is established as a framework for participation in the collective destiny, thus recognizing the right to participate, as a citizen, in the civic life of one's country. On the other hand, the concept of citizenship refers to exercising civic rights and duties.

His words, “the usual practice among countries,” stand without the support of comparative legal analysis or international jurisprudence. This rhetoric, seemingly rooted in a narrow interpretation of nationality, does not engage with the broader, more inclusive definitions recognized in international law. It neglects the dynamic and evolving nature of nationality as a concept that should encompass all legal citizens, irrespective of their origin, in the shared journey of a nation's progress and cultural enrichment.

Dr. Sapolinski's approach raises serious questions about the inclusivity and fairness of his interpretative framework. It highlights a concerning tendency to lean on subjective and potentially outdated viewpoints, which risks marginalizing significant segments of Uruguay's population and contradicts the inclusive spirit of modern international legal standards. I believe it contradicts Uruguay's Constitutions' inclusive spirit and authentic interpretation.

Dr. Sapolinski nevertheless asserts that legal citizens, foreigners who have voluntarily sought citizenship, should be denied diplomatic protection abroad. He advocates for this exclusion by defining “national” as a status linked exclusively to international protection, thereby perpetuating a discriminatory stance without substantial support.

This interpretation, not only lacking in evidential backing but also devoid of authoritative citations, seems to be rooted in a series of outdated and biased viewpoints. Dr. Sapolinski's final position is that the status of being a foreigner is an “objective fact” that remains unaltered, regardless of legal citizenship. This assertion starkly contrasts with the broader international legal community's views, where such a notion is far from considered “obvious.” International law often takes a contrary stance, emphasizing respect for human rights and inclusivity in defining nationality.

VI. International Law and Its Definitions of State, Nation, and National

Let us examine what international law provides concerning state, nation, and national. We can do so with citations. In international law, a state, also called a nation, comprises four essential elements: a defined territory, a permanent population, a government, and a capacity to conduct international relations.[1] A sovereign state can freely administer its population in its territory and set its foreign policy. In an eighteenth-century text, Emer de Vattel defined nations or states as "political bodies, societies of men who have united together and combined their forces, to procure their mutual welfare and society." He added, "Every nation which governs itself, under whatever form, and which does not depend on any other nation, is a sovereign state."[2]

The Uruguayan state, of which legal citizens are a part of the sovereignty, is considered, in international law and treaties, to be the nation of Uruguay. Internal, domestic, or municipal definitions are irrelevant for state-to-state obligations, such as those in statelessness treaties.

Nationality has a plain meaning in international law that cuts through all of the elaborate explanations in Dr. Sapolinski's article. "Nationality defines the legal relationship or 'legal bond' between the citizen/national and her state." Further, "this relationship is based on social facts of attachment and gives rise to rights and duties on the part of both sides of that relationship."[3] The International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the Nottebohm case indicated that "Nationality is a legal bond having as its basis a social fact of attachment, a genuine connection of existence, interest, and sentiments, together with the existence of reciprocal rights and duties."[4] From this, it is evident that nationality is determined by one's social ties to a nation, also called a state. When established, those ties give rise to rights and duties on the part of the state, as well as on the part of the national, who is also, in international law, called a citizen.

We find no mention of birth in these international materials. Outdated ethnic definitions have been cast aside. What is considered “obvious” to Dr. Sapolinski does not even merit mention in modern international decisions and texts.

Further contradicting Dr. Sapolinski's claim is the esteemed Uruguayan jurist Alberto Pérez Pérez, whose contributions to legal scholarship and human rights advocacy present a more enlightened and humane perspective. Pérez Pérez, a respected lawyer, human rights activist, and former Dean of the Faculty of Law at the University of the Republic, served as a judge on the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. His views and legal interpretations starkly contrast to the more limited opinions of Dr. Sapolinski.

Dr. Pérez Pérez elaborated on his belief that the Constitution of Uruguay did not indicate legal citizens were foreigners in 1995. The title of his article, in fact, is Legal Citizens are not Foreigners. Here is an excerpt:

As stated at the beginning, in my opinion, the concepts of nationality and citizenship are identical (or fully coincide), at least in a democratic State such as the Eastern Republic of Uruguay. Consequently, all citizens (i.e., both legal and natural) form, as a whole, a category that is opposed to that of foreigners.[5]

For a comprehensive examination of the Uruguayan Constitution, its provisions concerning nationality, and Uruguay's historical practices and communications that challenge Dr. Sapolinski's viewpoints, I refer readers to my recent publication, “The Constitutional Interpretation of Uruguayan Nationality According to the Uruguayan Constitutional Methodology,” published in the 29th volume of the ILSA Journal of International and Comparative Law, page 443, in 2023. That article includes many alternative views allowing for reasonable interpretations of the Constitution.

In conclusion, I firmly advocate for an approach grounded in academic rigor rather than subjective opinion. I align myself with the exemplary standards set by Alberto Pérez Pérez, whose scholarship represents the pinnacle of legal inquiry into nationality and citizenship in Uruguay. I stand with the straightforward international definitions of nation and national. This approach rejects simplistic assertions about what is “obvious” and “objective,” favoring a thorough and nuanced analysis based on law and history.

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[1] See the Convention on Rights and Duties of States, art. 1, 49 Stat. W. Janis 3097, T.S. No. 881, 3 Bevans 145, 165 L.N.T.S. 19 (done at Montevideo December 26, 1933; entered into force December 26, 1934.

[2] E, de Vattel, The Law of Nations 3-4, 11 (1758 ed. Fenwick trans. 1919).

[3] Edwards, A. (2014). The meaning of nationality in international law in an era of human rights. In A. Edwards & L. van Waas (Eds.), Nationality and Statelessness under International Law. Cambridge University Press.

[4] Nottebohm Case (Liechtenstein v. Guatemala); Second Phase, International Court of Justice (ICJ), 6 April 1955, ICJ Reports 1955, p. 4; General List, No. 18.

[5] Pérez Pérez, Alberto. "Los ciudadanos legales no son extranjeros." LJU Tomo 111, 297. Cita Online: UY/DOC/765/2009.

Dr. Darío Burstin Explains Problems with Uruguayan Nationality Interpretation on Radio Sarandí

I thank Radio Sarandí (Informativo Sarandí) for providing a forum for the topic of Uruguayan nationality and citizenship policies and fostering discourse in Uruguay on this crucial matter. I also thank Dr. Burstin for his accurate and insightful analysis of the issue. Dr. Burstin, as a legislative advisor for the Frente Amplio, addresses the topic with depth, understanding, and historical context.

An unofficial transcript, translated into English, is provided below.

The complete interview in Spanish is available at Radio Sarandí at the following link.

http://audios.sarandi690.com.uy/sarandi/diariosarandi/DiarioSarandi_240103.mp3

Unofficial Transcript

Informativo Sarandí

Interviewer: We greet Dr. Darío Burstin this morning here at Informativo Sarandí. Darío, welcome.

Dr. Darío Burstin: Thank you very much. It's a pleasure to be here this morning.

Interviewer: Well, Dr. Darío Burstin represents foreigners with Uruguayan citizenship who have been complaining for a long time now that their passports are not recognized as Uruguayan citizens despite having citizenship, and as a result, they face several problems. Among those problems, for example, are difficulties in entering other countries.

Dr. Darío Burstin: Exactly.

Interviewer: What is this situation about? How can a person who has obtained Uruguayan citizenship not be recognized as a Uruguayan? What’s happening here?

Dr. Darío Burstin: Good morning; thank you very much. First, a brief statement. I address this issue as a legislative advisor for the Frente Amplio. I do not represent the organizations advocating for this matter, but I have an excellent relationship with them and believe their claim is absolutely fair. Two law projects are currently underway to try to solve this issue. I did not work directly in their original drafting. I was not aware of the issue, but when I became aware of it, as it relates to issues I have studied, it became a topic of interest to me.

The situation is as follows.

In Uruguay, as most of the listeners probably know, our Constitution provides for two types of citizens. Natural citizens, who are basically those born in Uruguay and children of Uruguayans born abroad. Plus, there is a law that extends this to grandchildren, a somewhat more recent law. And legal citizens, who are basically immigrants, people born abroad (not as children of Uruguayans, who come to live in Uruguay) spend a certain number of years, meet requirements, apply for citizenship, and are granted it. I am the grandson of four legal citizens, now deceased. Surely, many of us in Uruguay also have this background.

Interviewer: Exactly.

Dr. Darío Burstin: That's why, at one time, legal citizens represented a very significant proportion of the Uruguayan population. What is the issue? Until 1994, Uruguayan passports stated that the holder of that passport was a natural citizen or a legal Uruguayan citizen. And with that, Uruguayan legal citizens had no problem entering other countries. Starting in 1994, Uruguay began a process of changing the format of passports to a standardized format. You see, before 1994, the Uruguayan passport had some unique aspects, but such differences were more acceptable. There was minimal international standardization of passports, and they were not all the same for all nations. From 1994 onwards, the format began to change.

Interviewer: And what happens then?

Dr. Darío Burstin: The international format of passports does not have a field that says “citizenship,” as our historical passports did, but the field says “nationality,” using another word. So why should that matter? Here in Uruguay, in the world of constitutional law, there is a historical position, a peculiar historical interpretation of the Constitution, that says that Uruguay distinguishes between nationals and citizens. And this is a topic that, if we were to delve into it, becomes very complex and abstract. But broadly speaking, the issue is as follows. Historically, some countries have classified two different types of “links” to a nation, one called national and one called citizen. In some cases, the nationals were those born in the country, or the historical descendants of people born in the country. We might call this a category of people belonging to a particular ethnicity. And then there were citizens — these are people who could participate in the political life of the country, they had the right to vote, to be elected, etc.

Here in Uruguay, what did we do at our founding? Our Constitution never made that distinction. It only speaks of citizens. So how did this change into what it is now? A very respected historical constitutional law professor (a very lucid man as well) believed that since the Constitution did not define which citizens were nationals or who were nationals at all, we, as interpreters, had to fix that omission of the Constitution. He then interprets, at least initially, that natural citizens (those born in Uruguay and children of Uruguayans born abroad) are the nationals of Uruguay, and he states that legal citizens are not nationals; they are only citizens.

According to this interpretation of the Constitution, Uruguay would be, to this day, the only country in the world that does not naturalize immigrants. That is, Uruguay is the one and only nation with this situation. I have not been able to find any other country that does not provide for what is called naturalization, which is the act of nationalizing a foreigner and considering them a national, a member of their national community. It would take a long time to get into the legal discussions of why ...

Interviewer: OK, but I have to ask, how does this play out in real life? What problems does this interpretation generate for legal citizens?

Dr. Darío Burstin: It became more of an issue with the chip in the passport, and it has been almost ten years since that happened. Legal citizens obtain citizenship, they vote, and they are involved. In past times, this distinction between nationality and citizenship was an issue at play in the interpretation of the constitutional law professors, probably the majority of those professors. But, for all intents and purposes, it was a historical practice. For me, before the passport issue, it didn’t generate any visible problems. It was a theoretical, abstract, national matter.

According to this interpretation of the Constitution I mentioned, which I myself do not share, though it is widely accepted in constitutional legal circles, Uruguay has an idiosyncrasy, or a quirk, in its policy and law. This quirk is that for the Uruguayan state, the foreigner who comes and obtains citizenship will always be a foreigner, according to this interpretation of the Constitution.

But the Constitution does not expressly say this in its text. The interpretation of what the Constitution “left out” did not generate any problems and did not go beyond legal discussion for many years. So you might ask, “What happened to change that?”

When Uruguay adapted to emerging international passport formats, and particularly since 2015, when passports started to be exclusively issued with a chip, the passport did not contain any useful location in which to clarify and explain whether the person with the passport was a legal or natural Uruguayan citizen. There wasn’t a place or area that an immigration officer would actually look at to read this. The passport can only say “nationality.” The civil identification division of the Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs interpreted — I mean, reading the constitutional law treatises— they interpreted that if the passport asks for nationality, we cannot say legal citizens are “Uruguayan.” That was the ministries’ interpretation. And through internal manuals, apparently, they came to the conclusion that in that field, Uruguay must put the country of birth. By the way, conceptually, putting the country of birth in this field is also a mistake.

Interviewer: Sure, but I, obviously, from ignorance, but those of us who have, for example, obtained foreign citizenship, if an Uruguayan natural citizen takes an Italian passport, he or she has to apply for citizenship to be granted a passport. How does Uruguay issue a passport to a foreigner? How do you issue a passport to a citizen who is not from your country? Because they have citizenship. Even this is something that is under discussion. It's already wrong from the start.

Dr. Darío Burstin: Exactly, I understand that what is happening here is that we have a confusion between these two concepts.

Interviewer: Now I think I’m understanding all the initial information, right?

Dr. Darío Burstin: Exactly. But we come to something completely … It's significant, I mean, if they are not nationals, if the foreigners, even my grandparents, were not nationals.

Interviewer: But how many Uruguayans travel and spend time in the European Union with their Italian or Spanish passports, right? What happens in practice for legal citizens that is different?

Dr. Darío Burstin: In practice, what happens is that legal Uruguayan citizens, immigrants who obtained citizenship in Uruguay, try to travel the world, but they are somewhat at the mercy of immigration officers, as they may or may not be allowed entry into the countries they want to visit depending on the interpretation of the immigration officer. I understand that a foreign immigration officer, when they see a Uruguayan passport that states it's issued by Uruguay, with nationality from Venezuela, Brazil, Spain, or anywhere else, has every right to be confused and not understand what they are dealing with.

With good intentions, as many legal citizens in this situation have explained to me, they sometimes talk to the officers, get delayed, and face an additional problem because nowadays, in many international airports, they go through the standardized machine for “reading.”

What happens when Uruguayan passports are passed through automated systems? These airport machines immediately flag all Uruguayan legal citizen passports as errors, as the machines, and officers, expect the "country of emission" field (that is, the nation issuing a passport) and the nationality field to match. So, legal citizens are left at the discretion of the immigration officer. We have cases of Uruguayans who can't enter countries.

Imagine the scenario of an immigration officer accustomed to automatic processing, the machine gives an error, and they have to go to the counter to explain and understand why the machine gave an error, and they see this Uruguayan passport.

Many officers do not understand, and as I've been told, many Uruguayans have been sent back from trips, legal citizens. In many cases, what they tell me happens is that the airlines, if they allow a person to travel without proper documentation, become responsible for the “illegal entry.” If the person is not allowed to enter the country at immigration after getting off the plane, the airline is responsible for bringing the person back. So, in many cases, the airlines no longer allow them to travel. Passengers about whom the airline employees have any doubts do not get to board the plane. I have seen and even shown cases of legal Uruguayan citizens who tried to enter Brazil, and the immigration officer suspected the passport was fake, denied entry, and invalidated it, placing a cancellation notice.

Interviewer: Ah, that's harsh.

Dr. Darío Burstin: Exactly.

Interviewer: Is there an estimate of how many people might be exposed to this type of situation?

Dr. Darío Burstin: From what I've been told, the legal citizens currently living in these circumstances, well, in the previous generation, there were many more, but now I believe the majority are relatively recent immigrants. According to what I've been told, there are around 35,000 people, and the problems vary greatly. For example, a person who doesn't travel today obviously doesn't have this problem. People who travel to certain countries where immigration authorities, like Argentina, for instance, understand what a Uruguayan passport looks like don't encounter significant issues. Countries that already require a visa for Uruguay, such as the case of the United States, also don't cause problems because they have to apply for the visa, and that document is what matters to them.

Interviewer: Exactly.

Dr. Darío Burstin: So, there is no problem in those cases. However, some people have significant issues, and Uruguay may even be violating international agreements. You see, there are legal Uruguayan citizens who come from countries that do not allow dual nationality.

Interviewer: For example?

Dr. Darío Burstin: For example, India. There's also a case that has been in the news, a person from Tajikistan. However, there are many countries that do not allow dual nationality. It's not something unusual.

Interviewer: What is the problem with other countries' denial of dual nationality?

Dr. Darío Burstin: If a person obtains legal citizenship in Uruguay, Uruguay believes it hasn't granted them nationality. However, the country of origin generally sees Uruguayan legal citizenship as a form of nationality. Because that's how it is in almost the entire world today. Being a citizen and being a national of a country are usually the same thing. Almost everywhere. So, what happens? By losing their original nationality and Uruguay saying it doesn't grant them nationality, that person is left without any nation that recognizes them as a national. They become someone without nationality.

Interviewer: Dr. Burstin, what is the solution to this issue? Is it a legislative matter at the parliamentary level? You've mentioned a couple of projects are underway.

Dr. Darío Burstin: Exactly, there are bills. However, I believe this issue can also be resolved administratively through a simple decision by the Ministry of the Interior, the DNIC (Dirección Nacional de Identificación Civil). It can be solved this way because the theoretical construction that denies legal citizens their nationality is an interpretation of the Constitution.

In my opinion, it's a flawed interpretation despite its origins with a highly respected professor whose legal treatises are fundamental in the field of constitutional law in Uruguay. That's why this interpretation has had such influence. In reality, it's an interpretation based on omission. The professor argued that since the Constitution doesn't distinguish or define who are the nationals of Uruguay, he had to make a distinction. He concluded that natural citizens are nationals, and legal citizens are foreigners.

That's an interpretation. And I believe it even goes against the spirit of the framers of the Constitution.

When the drafters of the original Constitution addressed citizenship, their intention was precisely to be as inclusive as possible. They said, "We don't need to make distinctions like other countries did, where someone might be born or reside in that country and never be granted nationality." Uruguay had a broad commitment to granting nationality to anyone, so they didn't bother making that distinction. Therefore, it's almost paradoxical that we went from an intention by the drafters of the Constitution to be inclusive to a later interpretation of the Constitution that ends up reading it as opposed to inclusion.

If the DNIC in the Ministry of the Interior interprets legal Uruguayan citizenship as a form of naturalization, in other words, a form of nationality, the problem is resolved because that means the passports for legal citizens should state "Uruguayan" under nationality. And if the passport says "Uruguayan," the problem is solved.

There's another option to solve this whole thing that is even simpler. One can argue that the distinction between national and citizen is theoretical and shouldn't be so important in day-to-day administrative practice. We can decide administratively that, for identification purposes, at least, nationality is the same as citizenship.

So, regardless of what the Constitution does or doesn't say, we can decide administratively to label legal citizens as nationals on their passports.

Interviewer: And what resources have been thrown behind this to achieve this result?

Dr. Darío Burstin: Well, since the DNIC and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs haven't made this administrative or practical decision, there are two bills that aim to, let's say, push for this. In one case legislators seek to push this to reality through interpreting the Constitution, and, in a second project, the push comes through the path of defining what it means to be a “national” on a passport. The project from the Frente Amplio, presented by Verónica Mato, is the more comprehensive one because, apart from wanting to solve the passport issue, the proposed law also aims to address other problems faced by immigrants, those who apply for citizenship. I know that’s another topic we discussed when we were considering this interview, right? Something immigrants facing legal citizenship already face, the difficulty of diploma validation, their situation when they first arrive, and so on. These are issues that immigrants find much more challenging in their daily lives.

Interviewer: Yes, exactly.

Dr. Darío Burstin: And yet Uruguay is, according to what they say, I don't have direct knowledge, but according to what they say, one of the countries with the most cumbersome procedures and requirements to obtain legal citizenship. The specific problem that the project presented by Verónica Mato tries to tackle is what happens with the citizenship/nationality of immigrant children. Why does this happen? If an immigrant arrives in Uruguay with their family, all born abroad, the immigrant, being of legal age, can apply for legal citizenship. But Uruguay requires legal adulthood to apply for legal citizenship. So, they can apply for it, but their children cannot. In other words, they cannot apply for their children. To become legal Uruguayan citizens, the children will have to wait until they turn 18, and only then can they begin the process. This means, of course, that settled families have children who lack an national identity.

Interviewer: That doesn't mean they don't have an identity.

Dr. Darío Burstin: Well, of course they do as legal residents, but not as citizens. Uruguay is otherwise a country that is quite open and quite inclusive, especially for education.

But the inability to be a citizen, let alone a national, creates identity issues for children, right? Let's say, especially for kids who have grown up here from the age of 3. They feel like they've been part of this country. Here in Uruguay, they feel more Uruguayan than any other “nationality,” and yet, we in Uruguay currently don't recognize them as Uruguayan.

I’ve even heard that some of these children have been denied the chance to carry the national flag at school events because they are not considered nationals. And there are other issues that may seem less important, but they should matter to Uruguayans, such as the possibility of representing us in sports competitions.

A very good friend of mine is a sports journalist, and he mentioned that many immigrant children have great potential to compete and yet this policy denies them the chance or the possibility to represent the nation of Uruguay.

Request for a Thematic Hearing on Statelessness and Nationality in Uruguay

Today I filed a request for a thematic hearing on behalf of Somos Todos Uruguayos. The request, submitted to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, seeks to bring together state, non-state, and civil society actors to review the current Uruguayan implementation of the statelessness conventions and the denial of nationality to Uruguayan legal citizens. If granted, the hearing will occur at the 189th Period of Sessions of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) from February 26 to March 7, 2024. 

Somos Todos Uruguayos is a Uruguayan civil association representing over 30,000 individuals. It seeks the thematic hearing on Uruguay's adherence to commitments to end statelessness as implemented through domestic law and to address human rights concerns related to the denial of Uruguayan nationality to naturalized citizens, termed "legal citizens" in Uruguay.

An executive summary and extended legal and factual brief were submitted, highlighting the urgent need for a hearing. The request focused on Uruguayan Law No. 19.682, which addressed statelessness but failed to grant nationality to those found stateless. Alternatively, if the law does provide nationality, then Uruguay’s refusal to acknowledge the Uruguayan nationality of all legal citizens is incorrect. The failure of Law No. 19.682, or at least the fact that it is contradictory, raises questions about Uruguay's policies on nationality and citizenship, particularly as Uruguay considers and classifies legal citizens, the highest status attainable by stateless individuals or immigrants, as non-nationals with limited rights compared to nationals.

The proposed thematic discussion aims to resolve these inconsistencies, review the arbitrary revocation and denial of the nationality of Uruguayan legal citizens, present alternative constitutional legal theorists and approaches to the denial of Uruguayan nationality for legal citizens, and potentially avoid the need for a request for precautionary measures or a formal complaint filed first with the Inter-American Commission for Human Rights The discussion was intended to clarify positions and enable civil society, the state, and international actors to progress, either collaboratively or in conflict.

Somos Todos Uruguayos makes clear that it is prepared to proceed with an emergency request and a formal complaint on behalf of the human rights violations to which Uruguayan legal citizens are subjected.

A full copy of the request for a thematic hearing is available for download.

Request for Thematic Hearing

Legal Citizens of Uruguay are Not Foreigners

Uruguay’s most renewed international legal jurist in constitutional law and human rights wrote in 1995 that all citizens of Uruguay are nationals of Uruguay.

Why has this been ignored in the Oriental Republic of Uruguay in favor of less well-reasoned legal opinions, consisting mostly of repetitions of a legal text from the 1940s of dubious intellectual depth on the topic of nationality, repeated by legal scholars in Uruguay to this day?

Here, precisely, is the thesis of Dr. Pérez Pérez, elaborated by him in 1995, and, one might be shocked to learn, considered and somehow rejected by Parliament, the Ministry of the Interior, the Ministry of the Exterior, and the DNIC in the period beginning in 2015 when Uruguayan legal citizens were denied nationality and stripped of functioning international passports by being labeled as “foreigners.”

As stated at the beginning (supra, para. 2-c), in my opinion, the concepts of nationality and citizenship are identical (or fully coincide), at least in a democratic State such as the Eastern Republic of Uruguay. Consequently, all citizens (i.e., both legal and natural) form, as a whole, a category that is opposed to that of foreigners.

Dr. Alberto Pérez Pérez, born on 15 June 1937 in Montevideo, Uruguay, and passing away on 2 September 2017 in the same city, was perhaps the Uruguayan constitutional lawyer and jurist of the highest international prestige and Uruguay’s most respected figure in the realm of law and human rights. He held the esteemed position of Judge of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights from 2010 to 2015. His dedication to the field was evident not only in his professional roles but also in his academic pursuits. He was educated at the University of the Republic.

Dr. Alberto Pérez Pérez

Pérez Pérez's legal acumen was recognized early in his career. He graduated with honors from the Faculty of Law at the University of the Republic in 1960. He next continued his legal training in the United States, achieving highest honors at Southern Methodist University in Texas, and then a Master of Comparative Law from Columbia University. 

His teaching career was likewise extraordinary. Pérez Pérez began his career as a professor at the Faculty of Law of the University of the Republic in 1962. Initially teaching Constitutional Law and Public International Law, he soon ascended to the position of a Full Professor of Constitutional Law in 1970. His commitment to human rights was further solidified in 1994 when the Chair of Human Rights was instituted at the Faculty, and he was appointed as its Full Professor. 

His leadership qualities were evident when he was elected as the Dean of the Faculty of Law at the University of the Republic in 1973. However, his views were not consistent with the military dictatorship, and his teaching led to his swift dismissal. He was in exile for most of the civil-military dictatorship.

On the international front, Pérez Pérez's contributions were significant. He served the United Nations between 1977 and 1985, culminating his tenure as the Chief of the Administrative Review Department. He was recognized by the Municipality of Montevideo, where he served as the Director General of the Legal Department between 1990 and 1995. In 2006, he played a pivotal role as an Advisor to the Eastern Republic of Uruguay before the International Court of Justice, addressing the conflict between Argentina and Uruguay over cellulose plants. In the latter part of his career, from 2010 onwards, Pérez Pérez served as a Judge of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights under the Organization of American States, further cementing his legacy in the field of human rights and law.

Why, precisely, did Dr. Alberto Pérez Pérez conclude that all Uruguayan citizens are nationals of Uruguay, both legal citizens and natural citizens?

In his 1995 journal article entitled “Legal citizens are not foreigners,” Dr. Pérez Pérez presented a detailed argument based on Uruguayan constitutional history, Uruguayan constitutional methodology, and domestic and international law.

In an ironic reversal of his positions, almost cruel in its opposition to his true conclusion, lawyers for the Uruguayan government have justified the denial of nationality to Uruguayan naturalized citizens by quoting one small sentence in the article of Dr. Pérez Pérez, out of context. That is, when describing the “orthodox” and incorrect position in Uruguayan constitutional law, Dr. Pérez Pérez wrote that the foundational Constitutional legal scholar Justino Jiménez de Aréchaga held a view opposite that of Dr. Pérez Pérez. He wrote that Aréchaga, “The introducer of the juridical method in the teaching of Constitutional Law in our country held that … Nationality and citizenship are two entirely distinct individual conditions; and the latter does not proceed from the former, but from membership in a political society.” Further, Dr. Pérez Pérez wrote that Aréchaga held that “Nationality is a permanent state of individuals which undergoes no alteration whatever the point of the earth they inhabit; citizenship is, on the contrary, variable and alters with the different domiciles which men acquire in the different societies into which mankind is divided.”

Dr. Pérez Pérez did not believe that Justino Jiménez de Aréchaga was correct, either according to Uruguayan history or constitutional methodology. He was stating his position. But when a lawyer for the Uruguayan government wrote one of the key internal legal memorandums labeling Uruguayan legal citizens as foreigners, the only mention of Dr. Pérez Pérez is a citation that Dr. Pérez Pérez himself held the position attributed to Aréchaga. Such a citation is not an example of an outstanding legal citation or scholarship.

Dr. Pérez Pérez presented his legal arguments carefully. The work is so carefully constructed it is almost plodding to a lawyer trained in the United States. Undeniably, it is a renunciation and deconstruction of the legal arguments of those who have defended Justino Jiménez de Aréchaga and the denial of nationality to Uruguayan legal citizens.

The article, a presentation in tribute to the fifty-fifth anniversary of the legal journal La Justicia Uruguaya, indicates that Dr. Pérez Pérez addresses “the legal status of legal citizens within the legal system,” meaning the actual treatment such citizens receive. He provides two alternatives, one of which he advocates.

The position he identifies as “orthodox,” or accepted since the 1940s, is that of Justino Jiménez de Aréchaga. In this position, “the concepts of nationality and citizenship are different and heterogeneous since the former is of a real or sociological nature and the latter of a legal nature.” Notice that I indicate that Dr. Pérez Pérez is not stating fact but rather the assertion of a position he rejects.

A second position, one different from the position espoused by Aréchaga, is that “nationality and citizenship form like two concentric circles, so that all citizens are nationals, although only some nationals are citizens.” For example, this is a position held by the nation in which I practiced law for many years – the United States. Very few nationals of the United States live in the national territory and are subject to broad national sovereignty but do not have the right to participate politically, but there are some. This also describes the position of convicted felons in some states who retain nationality but are stripped of political citizenship.

A third position, diametrically opposed to Aréchaga,  is that “the concepts of nationality and citizenship are identical, at least in a democratic state.”  Dr. Pérez Pérez attributes this position to “democratic thought, fundamentally from Rousseau, was consecrated in the revolutions of the 18th century in North America and France and of the 19th century in Spanish-speaking America, and is in my opinion still valid as an interpretation of our constitutional texts, from 1830 to date.” 

This view of the philosophical and legal basis of Uruguayan law and the historical evolution of the Constitutions of South America, especially those available in historical context to the constituents of Uruguay in 1829, was fundamental to the research I conducted in my recently published review of Uruguayan nationality and citizenship. It was also, surprisingly, recently rejected out-of-hand, in a rather dismissive manner, by the Chair of Constitutional Law of the University of the Republic during what was intended to be an exchange of ideas at the University of the Republic.

What is this context and history that provides support for the fact that legal citizens were not considered foreigners by the constituents?

Dr. Pérez Pérez begins with the Constitution of Cádiz, the Constitution of 1812, drafted during the Peninsular War, when much of Spain was occupied by Napoleonic France. The Spanish, having retreated to Cádiz, provided the world with one of the original liberal constitutions. The Spanish constitution, of which the constituents were intimately familiar, provided the opportunity for foreigners who obtained a letter of naturalness (“naturaleza”) to become not just citizens of Spain but also Spaniards. Foreigners who obtained this status first became Spaniards and then later obtained a “special letter of citizenship.”

The term nationality, we are informed, was not commonly in use in 1812. It was not common as a concept even in 1829. We are directed to review Vezio Crisafulli and Domenico Nocetti, Vo. "Nazione", Enciclopedia del Diritto, volume XXVII, p. 789. Nevertheless, the concepts mirrored with less grace in the Uruguayan Constitution of 1830 were that all citizens of Spain were Spaniards (“nationals”), but only some Spaniards were citizens. This structure was followed by almost all the other Spanish-American constitutions. The Cádiz model has been followed in the Constitutions of Mexico, Colombia, Peru, Bolivia, Ecuador, Guatemala, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Honduras, the Dominican Republic, and Costa Rica. I have explored the history of the unadopted Argentinian Constitution our constituents in Uruguay had in hand in 1829 and the Chilean constitution, both of which also adopt the Cádiz model. The fact that there is any confusion about whether the original Uruguayan Constitution also intended to make all citizens “Uruguayans,” therefore what we call nationals, has only to do with inartful drafting and not intention. That inartful drafting was alluded to and forgiveness was sought in the very introduction to the Constitution.

In 1829, Sr. Ellauri, crucial to the drafting of the Constitution and its management, stated, “The commission does not have the vanity to convince itself that it has done an original, great or perfect work.” He continued, “The great and the perfect was compatible with the limited lights of the members of the Commission, and with the difficulties of all kinds that they had to overcome to conclude a work as delicate as it was important.” The Constitution was drafted in various locations, under some need for haste, “mistakes have been suffered in the different accidental residences,” each of which “without the necessary comfort for recollection and meditation, without books and without a numerous society of enlightened citizens to consult.” I sit here today and read these words from my 1870 copy of the Discusion de la Constitucion del Estatado Oriental del Uruguay by Carlos M. de Nava, the copy of which I am privileged to have that was originally used by Jose Maria Vidal. I clearly cherish the Uruguayan Constitution, but I know its origin.

Let us return to the words of Dr. Pérez Pérez, who concludes, of course, that:

Consequently, all citizens (i.e., both legal and natural) form, as a whole, a category that is opposed to that of foreigners. This is so both in the case that we call all citizens "nationals," and in the case that (for certain reasons of constitutional text in our country) we reserve this term to distinguish natural citizens and designate legal citizens as "naturalized ". In other words, every national is a citizen, and every citizen is a national (or "naturalized"), even if not all of them can exercise political or active citizenship rights.

Why is this accurate and the best interpretation of the Uruguayan constitution?

1. This is in agreement with the liberal and democratic conceptions that inspired the Uruguayan constitution since the constituents of 1829.

2. There is no evidence that the original or later constituents distinguished between nationality and citizenship.

3. A proper use of the Uruguayan constitutional interpretative methodology, ironically developed extensively by Justino Jimenez de Arechaga, supports that legal citizens are not foreigners, or, in the words of Dr. Pérez Pérez, “as regards the constitutional texts, in an interpretation that takes into account the provisions in force as a whole and extracts from them all the interpretative consequences in accordance with the general principles” does not support the denial of nationality to legal citizens.

4. Finally, more importantly than ever, given the growth of control of conventionality in the Inter-American system, denying nationality to legal citizens is contrary to public international law at both the customary and conventional levels.

Dr. Pérez Pérez expands upon and supports each of those four points, but the logic and evidence in his favor are overwhelming. It was after reviewing this article that I designed my further research, testing these propositions of Dr. Pérez Pérez, resulting in the publication of La Interpretación Constitucional De La Nacionalidad Uruguaya De Acuerdo Con La Metodologia Constitucional Uruguaya, available at the link below.

I encourage anyone interested to review the article by Dr. Pérez Pérez or to comment and engage with my article. I provide both links here.

https://www.nacionalidad.uy/downloads/PP_LJU_LCLNSE.pdf

https://somostodos.info/ilsa-esp

Announcing the publication of “The Constitutional Interpretation of Uruguayan Nationality According to the Uruguayan Constitutional Methodology,” 29 ILSA J. Int'l & Comp. L. 443 (2023).

I am pleased to announce the publication of my article on the constitutional interpretation of Uruguayan nationality. The article was published in English and Spanish and is available in Westlaw. A summary of the work is provided below.

The National Directorate of Civil Identification (DNIC) of Uruguay today issues Uruguayan passports to legal Uruguayan citizens (naturalized citizens) but refuses to recognize them as nationals of Uruguay . In other words, legal Uruguayan citizens carry a passport that indicates that they are not nationals of Uruguay. The Uruguayan state claims that this results from an interpretation of the Uruguayan Constitution made in 2018. The interpretation is based only on secondary sources based on an opinion of an Uruguyan legal scholar, Justino Jiménez de Aréchaga, articulated clearly by 1946. Uruguay is the only country in the world to declare that it has no path to naturalization for any immigrant. Uruguay instead allows "legal citizens" to obtain permanent status in Uruguay and obtain Uruguayan passports. The denial of nationality to legal citizens causes tremendous problems when these Uruguayans travel, places in question whether they receive diplomatic protection, and creates two classes of Uruguayans.

This manuscript analyzes the opinion of Justino Jiménez de Aréchaga and other Uruguayan constitutional legal scholars by applying the constitutional interpretative method developed by Uruguayan legal scholars. This method, labelled within Uruguay as the logical-systematic-teleological method of constitutional interpretation, contains precise instructions on the steps and approaches to be taken in interpretating the Constitution.

The source of the confusion and the resulting unique position that Uruguay maintains in denying any process for naturalization for its immigrants results from a misinterpretation of Article 81 of the current Constitution. The predecessor this clause, Article 71, was added only in the 1934 Constitution, and the surprising conclusion that Uruguay's constitution disallows all naturalization is not based on the interpretation most compatible with the Uruguay Constitution nor does it follow the Uruguayan method of constitutional interpretation.

Uruguay often interprets its Constitution through positive law. The current law governing nationality, Law 16.021, is based solely on the misinterpretation of Article 81. Efforts to reform Uruguayan law have begun and Uruguay could easily provide an interpretation of its Constitution on these issues that comports with its own internal interpretative methodology, expands rights in accord with its tradition, and that is in accord with Uruguay's international convention obligations.

La República Oriental del Uruguay es una asociación política de los habitantes en el territorio y sus participantes políticos, sus ciudadanos, son lo que la comunidad internacional considera uruguayos

La República Oriental del Uruguay, tal como se define en el artículo 1 de la Constitución, es la asociación política de los habitantes dentro de su territorio. Esta definición, que data de la constitución original de Uruguay en 1830, la diferencia de otras definiciones de estados o naciones en ese momento e incluso sigue siendo inusual en la actualidad. Para comprender el contexto en el que se redactó la constitución uruguaya en 1829, es esencial considerar varias influencias en sus redactores.

Al menos tres ejemplos previos de constituciones probablemente tuvieron importancia para quienes redactaron la constitución uruguaya. El primero es la Constitución Española de Cádiz de 1812, que estaría en vigor cuando las colonias españolas declararon su independencia. Según esta constitución, la nación española es la reunión de todos los españoles de ambos hemisferios y la soberanía reside esencialmente en la nación, otorgándole el derecho exclusivo de establecer leyes fundamentales. El segundo ejemplo es la Constitución de 1819 de las Provincias Unidas de Sudamérica, que no proporcionó una definición clara de "las Provincias Unidas de Sudamérica". Por último, la Constitución de Argentina de 1826, aunque nunca se ratificó, comparte similitudes con la constitución uruguaya y probablemente fue consultada. Esta establece que la nación argentina es para siempre libre e independiente, no siendo propiedad de ningún individuo o familia, y adopta una forma de gobierno republicana representativa.

Las constituciones chilenas de 1822, 1828 y 1833 también ofrecen perspectivas sobre la definición de una nación. La Constitución de Chile de 1822 define la nación chilena como la unión de todos los chilenos, con la soberanía que reside esencialmente en la nación. La Constitución de 1828 amplía aún más, indicando que la nación chilena es una asociación política de todos los chilenos naturales y legales, libres e independientes de poderes extranjeros, y dividida en ocho provincias. La Constitución de 1833 no define explícitamente a Chile, pero reitera la naturaleza popular y representativa de su gobierno, la indivisibilidad de la República de Chile y la soberanía esencial de la nación delegada a las autoridades establecidas por la constitución.

Al comparar estos ejemplos, se hace evidente que la definición de la República Oriental del Uruguay se destaca. Mientras que la Constitución Española de 1812 define España como una reunión de españoles, incluyendo a individuos naturalizados, y las constituciones chilenas de 1822 y 1828 definen sus respectivas naciones como la unión de todos los chilenos, Uruguay define de manera única su República como una asociación política de habitantes. Esta distinción sigue siendo única, ya que otras naciones suelen referirse a su "nación" o "estado" en lugar de una asociación política.

La influencia de estos modelos constitucionales en los redactores de la constitución de Uruguay es evidente, pero la definición única de Uruguay refleja el contexto histórico y político específico en el que se estableció. Al definir la nación como una asociación política, Uruguay enfatiza la inclus ón y la naturaleza colectiva de su república, destacando la importancia de sus habitantes en la configuración de la gobernabilidad y legislación del país. Esta definición distintiva de la República Oriental del Uruguay sigue dando forma a su identidad como estado-nación, diferenciándolo de otros marcos constitucionales y resaltando la importancia de su pueblo en el entramado político del país.

La Constitución uruguaya de 1830 no denota explícitamente a los individuos como "nacionales" o "uruguayos", sino que habla en términos de ciudadanos - tanto naturales como legales. Concibe a la nación como una entidad política compuesta por sus ciudadanos, independientemente de su nacionalidad. La ciudadanía podía adquirirse a través del nacimiento en el país o cumpliendo con los criterios de ciudadanía legal.

Es posible que la Constitución haya considerado la "nacionalidad" como un concepto subordinado, menos significativo en comparación con la ciudadanía. La República Oriental del Uruguay no se constituyó sobre la base de la nacionalidad, sino como una asamblea política. Curiosamente, los individuos podían nacer y vivir en Uruguay sin ser ciudadanos, lo que generó un debate sobre el estatus de estos residentes no ciudadanos, especialmente las mujeres.

Justino Jiménez de Arechaga Moratorio señaló estas ambigüedades, pero a pesar de ello, la definición única de Uruguay de la nación enfatiza su naturaleza política. Los ciudadanos participan en la política, ejercen sus derechos y son miembros integrales de la república, con el derecho de permanecer, servir, cumplir deberes y poseer pasaportes internacionales. Todos bajo la protección de la República merecen estos derechos, no solo aquellos nacidos en suelo uruguayo o sus descendientes.

El entendimiento internacional de "nacional" se alinea más con la avanzada definición de ciudadanía de Uruguay que con el lugar de nacimiento. Si Uruguay ve la "nacionalidad" - el término globalmente utilizado para referirse a los ciudadanos - como problemática, podría demostrar su perspectiva progresista traduciéndola a su concepto de ciudadanía.

El enfoque de Uruguay puede indicar su avance sobre otras naciones en la ampliación del concepto de pertenencia al estado. En el derecho internacional, la idea de un estado no está necesariamente vinculada a la nación. Así, el estado uruguayo podría estar compuesto por personas de múltiples nacionalidades. Todos los ciudadanos pertenecen políticamente a Uruguay y se consideran "uruguayos" globalmente, a pesar de las diferentes nacionalidades.

Las discrepancias lingüísticas no deberían oscurecer los derechos sustantivos. Un individuo "sin estado" en inglés, "staatenlos" en alemán, o "no es miembro de un país" en chino apuntan hacia conceptos similares. Parece que la definición de ciudadanía de Uruguay se alinea más estrechamente con el concepto global de "nacionalidad" que cualquier otro término en Uruguay. Por lo tanto, la postura progresista de Uruguay en esta área no debería verse minada debido a un malentendido léxico.

Uruguay ha comprendido durante mucho tiempo un amplio entendimiento de "nacionalidad", aunque bajo la etiqueta de "ciudadanía", para evitar cualquier implicación étnica, nacionalista o nativista. Su posición histórica en cuanto a la ciudadanía inclusiva y la pertenencia al estado merece ser enaltecida. Su reconocimiento de que la ciudadanía no depende únicamente del lugar de nacimiento y su esfuerzo por remediar la apatridia ofreciendo ciudadanía legal, subrayan su compromiso de proteger los derechos individuales y garantizar una amplia participación nacional.

No se debe permitir que un malentendido en el vocabulario disminuya el liderazgo de Uruguay en este campo. Uruguay debe explicar que tuvo una amplia "nacionalidad" antes que casi cualquier otra nación en el mundo y que el concepto simplemente se etiquetó como "ciudadanía" para evitar connotaciones étnicas, nacionalistas o nativistas.

Nationality and Citizenship in Uruguayan Constitutional Doctrine

It is essential for the English-speaking world and the broader international legal community to understand the current legal framework separating nationality and citizenship in Uruguay. I start with one of the leading and honored experts in Uruguayan Constitution Law and International Law, Dr. Ruben Correa Freitas. Dr. Correa Freitas published the sixth edition of Derecho Constitucional Conemporaneo in 2019.

Dr. Correa Freitas indicates that nationality and citizenship hold significant legal-political implications, involving domestic Public Law, specifically Constitutional Law, and International Law. The complex historical context and evolving global landscape, including migratory flows and political events, have impacted the study and regulation of these concepts. Consequently, analyzing nationality and citizenship through Comparative Law, he writes, is crucial for identifying common criteria recognized by the international community to address the legal-political aspects of this phenomenon.

Moreover, if one can assert that Constitutional Law is the science of freedom, I believe that nationality and citizenship hold a position as significant as that, for it would be futile for an individual to be free if they lack a nation or are unable to actively participate in the political life of their state as a citizen.

To those trained in international law in jurisdictions other than Uruguay, the following will initially appear foreign and somewhat confusing. The experience may be one of finding oneself in an unfamiliar city with a map that has a legend, but the words on the legend, while used in other cities of the world, have a different meaning for the authors of this particular map. The map's author and the person using it think the words in the legend have a clear meaning. But the world and Uruguay, the person using the map and the author of the map in my metaphor, do not mean the same thing by the exact words.

It is easy to get lost when that is the case. But what follows is a clear and precise explanation of the Uruguayan legal doctrine.

Dr. Correa Freitas argues that it is crucial to distinguish between nationality and citizenship, as they are different concepts that sometimes need clarification. Nationality is an original link between a person and a State or Nation, established by birth or blood connection with parents. On the other hand, citizenship is a political relationship between an individual and a State, conferring certain rights and duties. International law emphasizes the right to nationality and the right to change nationality while asserting that no person can have more than one nationality. Nationality is opposed to foreignness, and citizenship is divided into natural and legal citizenship. Consequently, it is essential to differentiate between nationality and foreignness, as well as natural and legal citizenship.

In Comparative Law, Dr. Corre Freitas indicates, the distinction between nationality and citizenship is well-established. Various constitutions, such as those of Costa Rica, Venezuela, and Peru, distinguish between nationals and foreigners and regulate citizenship separately. They address the rights and duties of citizens, focusing on aspects such as age and political qualifications. This distinction highlights the importance of understanding the differences between nationality and citizenship in a legal context.

It is worth noting, and perhaps marking for later discussion, that the examples provided in this text do not support an assertion that any of the listed nations deny nationality to naturalized citizens. The examples do provide information on how each nation addresses the differences between being a national and having the right to participate in the political life of the State.

Continuing to review the outstanding explanation of this view of the Uruguayan Constitution, Dr. Correa Freitas informs that in the 1967 Uruguayan Constitution, nationality and citizenship are regulated in Section III, with natural citizens being those born in the country or children of Oriental parents who settle and register in the Civic Registry. Nationality is not lost even by naturalizing in another country and can be regained by settling in the Republic and registering in the Civic Registry. The Constitution adopts "ius soli" and "ius sanguinis" criteria for nationality, with Oriental nationality being irrevocable and allowing for dual nationality. However, confusion exists between nationality and natural citizenship, as demonstrated by the illogical provision of suspension of citizenship for not reaching eighteen years of age.

The conclusion on the doctrine of Uruguayan nationality and its comparison to citizenship can then be summarized.

In summary: applying the logical-systematic interpretation criterion, it can be concluded that in the 1967 Uruguayan Constitution, a distinction is made between nationals and foreigners on one hand, and natural citizens and legal citizens on the other hand. According to the constitutional text, nationality and natural citizenship are synonymous, meaning that every man or woman born in Uruguay, strictly speaking in the territory of the Republic, or a child of an Oriental father or mother who settles and registers in the Civic Registry, is a natural citizen (Article 74) and therefore, national, irrevocably according to Article 81.

In 1989, Law No. 16,021 was enacted to regulate nationality in Uruguay due to confusion in the existing Uruguayan Constitution. The law recognizes the criteria of "jus soli" (place of birth) and "jus sanguinis" (blood ties with father or mother), granting Uruguayan nationality to those born in the Republic's territory and their children, regardless of birthplace.

Initially, Law No. 16,021 didn't grant natural citizenship to children of persons born abroad who were granted Uruguayan nationality. Law No. 19,362, enacted on December 31, 2015, corrected this by granting natural citizenship to such children.

Law No. 16,021 also interprets Article 74 of the Constitution, defining "avecinamiento" (settlement) and its requirements for obtaining Uruguayan nationality. Amended by Law No. 18,858 on December 23, 2011, "avecinamiento" occurs when actions unequivocally demonstrate a person's intention, such as living in the country for over three months, renting or acquiring property, establishing a business, obtaining employment, or enrolling in an educational institution for a minimum of two months. Two of these requirements must be presented before the Electoral Court, which verifies the information and proceeds with registration (Article 5, as amended by Law No. 19,362 of 12/31/15).

The summary of Uruguayan law on this matter is stated succinctly.

After analyzing the Uruguayan constitutional system and considering comparative law, the following conclusions can be drawn:

a) The Uruguayan Constitution confuses the concepts of nationality and citizenship, particularly between nationality and natural citizenship.

b) There is a significant trend, especially in Latin American constitutionalism, to separately and rigorously regulate nationality and citizenship.

c) Generally, the criteria of "jus soli" and "jus sanguinis" are accepted as means of acquiring nationality, without prejudice to admitting naturalization.

d) It is advisable to promote the signing of international treaties that regulate the acquisition and loss of nationality and conflicts of dual nationality.

e) In a future constitutional reform in the Oriental Republic of Uruguay, provisions related to nationality and citizenship should be modified to adapt them to modern trends in doctrine and comparative constitutional law.

Dr. Correa Freitas leaves the possibility that the Uruguayan Constitution could be subject to a reform to adapt to modern trends and states that there is no prejudice in admitting naturalization as a source of nationality in such a reform.